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AN EXAMINATION OF PATENTS, LICENSING,
RESEARCH TOOLS, AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE
ANTICOMMONS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
Michael S. Mireles*
The continued development of and affordable access to potentially life saving
pharmaceuticals, gene therapies and diagnostics is unquestionably a socially im-
portant issue. However, crafting government policy to encourage the development
of and allowing affordable access to those services and products is difficult. On
one hand, the development of those services and products requires a large invest-
ment of funds because of the complexity, collaborative nature, and uncertainty of
the development of those products and services. Accordingly, investors require the
safety of strong and stable patent rights to ensure a return on their investment in
the development of a commercial end-product or a research tool. On the other
hand, patents may foreclose competition for a particular product or service and
enable a company to exact a supra competitive price for that product or service,
thus denying access to people unable to afford that product or service. In arriving
at that supra competitive price, the company selling the commercial end product
may have to include in that price a number of additional costs imposed by holders
of patented research tools needed in the development of the commercial end-product.
This Article examines whether the development of pharmaceuticals, gene therapies
or diagnostics is being stifled by the inability of companies to access proprietary re-
search tools needed for the development of those important products and services.
This Article also evaluates proposals for alleviating problems in accessing proprie-
tary research tools, and proposes recommendations to aid in the efficient transfer of
that technology. First, this Article recommends that Congress enact a law similar to
the proposed Genomic Science and Technology Innovation of Act of 2002, which
requires the government to conduct a study of the effect of government policy on
biotechnology innovation. Second, this Article recommends that the government
encourage public and private parties to enter patent pools to efficiently transfer
rights in biotechnology inventions. The government, in conjunction with private
and public institutions, should create a publicly available database of proprietary
research tools and licenses concerning those tools. The government should also
modify the provision of the Bayh-Dole Act concerning reservation of a non-
exclusive right to practice any patented invention created with federal funding.
The modification would allow the government to transfer a non-exclusive license
to a patented research tool developed with government funding to a patent pool
created by industry participants if it is demonstrated that the owner of the patented
research tool is unreasonably withholding the license of that tool from the pool. Any
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royalties resulting from the licensing of the research tool in the patent pool will be
distributed to the owner of the patented research tool.
Part I of this Article provides definitions for research tools and commercial appli-
cations. Part II discusses the costs, benefits, and purposes of patent law. Part III
reviews university and private research and development, including the influence
of the Bayh-Dole Act. Part IV examines the development of commercial applica-
tions of biotechnology research, including the role of venture capital and the use of
licensing provisions requiring reach through royalties and exclusivity. Part V
evaluates problems that may occur in attempting to develop commercial applica-
tions and licensing patents. Part VI reviews the Tragedy of the Anticommons
theory. Part VII discusses research and analysis concerning the existence of the an-
ticommons problem. Part VIII examines and analyzes potential solutions for
solving the Tragedy of the Anticommons in biotechnology. Finally, Part IX offers
recommendations for addressing an existing or developing Tragedy of the Anti-
commons.
INTRODUCTION
The complex and uncertain nature of biotechnology innovation'
results in an increasing need for collaborations between multiple
public and private institutions to share costs, proprietary technol-
ogy, and specialized skills to develop commercial applications such
as pharmaceuticals, gene therapies, and diagnostics. 2 A single
1. Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical
Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 125, 126 (1998); FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PAT-
ENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, p. 16 (October 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/
10/innovationrpt.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT] ("R&D is particularly lengthy for biotechnology firms, because
biotechnology innovation is more uncertain than innovation in other industries.").
2. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), GE-
NETIC INVENTION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES ch. 1, p. 7
(2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] ("Biotechnol-
ogy is a fast-moving field in which new products and services are developed from an
increasingly complex and cumulative set of underlying technologies."); REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS 3, available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/ (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) [hereinafter NIH REPORT] ("Biomedical researchers increasingly chose to
collaborate with entrepreneurial companies that understood and valued basic science
.... "); Richard Florida, The Role of the University: Leveraging Talent, Not Technology, in AAAS
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY YEARBOOK 2000 366 (Albert H. Tecih et al., eds., 1999),
available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/yearbook/2000/ch31.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ('Joint university-industry research centers have ...
grown dramatically, and a lot of money is being spent on them."); Arti K. Rai, Regulating
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pharmaceutical may cost as much as $800 million 3 and require
numerous proprietary inputs, owned or subject to a tax by multiple
parties, to develop. Accordingly, the ability of public and private
entities to efficiently transfer proprietary technology is critical to
the development of socially beneficial commercial applications.
This Article explores whether public and private entities are en-
countering difficulties in transferring proprietary rights necessary
to develop commercial applications. This Article also evaluates
proposals for alleviating problems in accessing proprietary tech-
nology, such as research tools, and proposes recommendations to
aid in the efficient transfer of that technology.
Patent law provides the principal legal protection for biotech-
nology innovation. In 1980, the United States Supreme Court
decided Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which paved the way for the pat-
enting of biotechnological products and processes. That decision,
along with the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed uni-
versities and small companies to retain tide in inventions
developed with government funding, created the biotechnology
industry and the resulting flood of patent applications and issued
patents for biotechnological inventions such as genes and gene
fragments.6 Patent protection for those inventions allowed bio-
technology companies to obtain much needed capital to fund
research and development.
7
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 110
(1999) ("[T]he legal developments of the 1980s and 1990s have generated a large variety of
academic-industrial relationships .... [S]ome academic-industrial relationships resemble
commercial joint ventures."); Lynn E. Nimtz et al., University-Industry Partnerships: Meeting the
Challenges with High Tech Partner, SRA JOURNAL, Fall 1995, at 9 ("Today's knowledge-based,
technological society demands much from higher education and the corporate world-
demands that often can be met through effective university-industry partnerships.");
DAVID M. EPSTEIN, ECKSTROM'S VOL. 2 LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
§ 11.3 (2003) ("University research costs--the costs of acquiring, maintaining and operating
equipment necessary to conduct state-of-the-art research-have been increasing rapidly
3. TUFTS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, Post-approval R & D raises to-
tal drug development costs to $897 million, IMPACT REPORT, May/June 2003, available at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/infoservices/impactreportpdfs/impactreportsummnarymayjune
20 0 3.pdf
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
4. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
5. The Government Patent and Policy Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94
Stat. 3015-28 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994)).
6. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY FACTS,
available at http://www.bio.org/er/statistics.asp (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (stating that 2,160 biotechnology patents were granted in 1989
compared to 7,763 biotechnology patents granted in 2002).
7. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 2, p. 1 ("Biotechnology start-ups rely on their
ability to patent their innovations to attract investment and continue innovating ....");
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Patent law is designed to correct a market failure wherein too
few inventions are created because copyists may easily free-ride on
the efforts of inventors.8 Patent law provides a right to exclude oth-
ers from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
patented invention to incentivize the creation and disclosure of
inventions.9 Patents also provide an incentive for capitalists to in-
vest in the commercialization, including the further innovation, of
patented technology.'1 In a perfect world, patent law doctrine
would reflect the most efficient mechanism to incentivize inven-
tion, the disclosure of inventions, and innovation, while at the
same time ensuring the existence of a public domain upon which
additional inventions may be built. However, in reality, patent law
may create roadblocks to the development of commercial applica-
tions, particularly when applied to a new technology, such as
biotechnology.
In 1998, Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg as-
serted that biotechnology innovation may be stifled because too
many property rights in biotechnology had been granted, resulting
in a situation called a "Tragedy of the Anticommons," wherein no
one party can collect those rights to develop a commercial applica-
tion." Heller and Eisenberg further argued that transaction costs,
including costs associated with bundling rights, strategic behavior,
and the cognitive biases of biotechnology industry participants, will
prevent parties from transferring rights to avoid a Tragedy of the
Anticommons.1
Two studies have offered apparently conflicting conclusions as to
whether a Tragedy of the Anticommons exists or may develop in
biotechnology. In one study, the National Institutes of Health
Bruce Lehman, Major Biotechnology Issues for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 33 CAL. W. L.
REV. 49, 50 (1996) (" [P] atenting is a very important part of commercializing biotechnology.
The biotechnology industry requires considerable capital expenditure .... That capital is
essential and the ability to get that capital is very much dependent upon the capacity to get
patent protection for a prospective product.").
8. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 13.4 (2003) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY].
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1) (1994); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Pat-
ent Law, 23J. OF LEGAL STUD. 247, 247, 267 (1994); Stanley M. Besen & LeoJ. Raskind, An
Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5-6 (1991).
10. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Eisenberg: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1017, 1045-46 (1989). See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
11. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (May 1, 1998).
12. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 700.
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("NIH") found that scientists in academia and industry, university
technology transfer professionals, and members of private firms
expressed concerns about the difficulties and delays associated
with licensing proprietary rights in biotechnology research tools.'"
Several years later, a second study conducted by Professors Walsh,
Arora, and Cohen, collected information from intellectual
property attorneys, business managers, and scientists from
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms; university researchers
and technology transfer officers; patent lawyers; government
personnel; and trade personnel. 4 The researchers in the Walsh
study also examined archival data. 5 The purpose of this study was
to analyze how changes in patenting practices and law have
affected biotechnology innovation. 6 The researchers concluded
that despite an increase in the number of patents on research tools
and conditions conducive to the creation of a Tragedy of the
Anticommons, the data collected demonstrate that, "drug
discovery has not been substantially impeded by these 
changes.' 7
In a recent article, Professor Paul David argues that the Walsh
Study is flawed in several respects. 8 First, David criticizes the study
for failing to describe the interview protocol followed in the survey.19
David notes that the form of the questions can result in responses
from interviewees indicating that there is not a problem.0 Second,
David asserts that rational actors would not report abandoned pro-
jects that otherwise might have been undertaken if patenting
practices and law had not changed. Accordingly, David argues that a
search for evidence of a Tragedy of the Anticommons is difficult be-
cause the researcher is attempting to prove a counterfactual: if
something had not happened, then something else would have
resulted.'
Based on research and analysis concerning the presence of a
Tragedy of the Anticommons, it is unclear whether the Tragedy
13. SeeNIH REPORT, supra note 2.
14. JoHN P. WALSH ET AL., Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innova-




17. Id. at 285, 293-97.
18. Paul A. David, The Economic Logic of "Open Science" and the Balance between Private
Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer, 13-15 (2003),
available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02-30.pdf (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
19. Id. at 13-14.
20. Id. at 14.
21. See id. at 16.
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exists or will exist in the biotechnology sector. A number of
commentators, however, have proposed solutions to the Tragedy of
the Anticommons; these solutions include making the utility
requirement more stringent,2 broadening the scope of the
experimental use exception to patent infringement,23 creating a
fair use exception to patent infringement,24 and using patent
pools.2 5 Because of the ambiguity of research concerning the
existence of a Tragedy of the Anticommons, this Article argues
against a substantial change in patent law doctrine that may
undermine the incentives provided by patents to invent, disclose,
and innovate. The capital intensive nature of the biotechnology
industry requires stable and strong property rights to justify
investment in research and development. 26 However, recent
Federal Circuit cases narrowly interpreting the experimental use
exception upset the expectations of academic scientists that the
use of patented technologies for university research is exempt from
patent infringement. 27 These new cases may increase the likelihood
that a Tragedy of the Anticommons will develop.
Accordingly, this Article recommends that certain actions be
taken to determine if a Tragedy of the Anticommons exists or will
develop and to alleviate the effects of an existing or a developing
Tragedy of the Anticommons. First, this Article recommends that
Congress enact a law similar to the proposed Genomic Science and
Technology Innovation Act of 2002,8 which requires the govern-
ment to conduct a study regarding the effect of government policy
on biotechnology innovation. Second, this Article recommends
that the government encourage public and private parties to enter
patent pools to efficiently transfer rights in biotechnology inven-
22. See, e.g., Teresa M. Summers, The Scope of Utility in the Twenty-First Century: New Guide-
lines for Gene-Related Patents, 91 GEO. L.J. 475,477-478 (2003).
23. Eisenberg, supra note 10; Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair" Rethinking the Ex-
perimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. Rv. 1, 9
(2001).
24. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1177 (2000).
25. SeeJEANNE CLARK ET AL., UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT
POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? (Dec. 5,
2000), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [hereinafter White Paper].
26. See BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION ON BAYH-DOLE AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OFFICE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY 1 (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.bio.org/ip/pdf/
bd20020509.pdf (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
27. SeeMadey v. Duke University, 307 F3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
28. H.R. 3966, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
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tions. The government, in conjunction with private and public in-
stitutions, should create a publicly available database of proprietary
research tools and licenses concerning those tools. The govern-
ment should also modify the provision of the Bayh-Dole Act
concerning reservation of a non-exclusive right to practice any
patented invention created with federal funding. The modification
would allow the government to transfer a non-exclusive license to a
patented research tool developed with government funding to a
patent pool created by industry participants if it is demonstrated
that the owner of the patented research tool is unreasonably with-
holding the license of that tool from the pool. Any royalties
resulting from the licensing of the research tool in the patent pool
would be distributed to the owner of the patented research tool.
This proposal attempts to provide increased access to research
tools while balancing the relative interests of the public and the
owners of proprietary technology. The public interest is protected
as greater access to research tools may result in the creation of
more commercial applications that benefit the public health.
Moreover, the public has already paid once for the research tool
and should be not taxed again at a high rate because a company
with government funded proprietary technology has chosen to
hold things up. In addition, one of the primary justifications for
the Bayh-Dole Act is the need for title in inventions to vest in pri-
vate firms to encourage the commercialization of inventions
created with government funding. 9 However, with research tools, a
market already exists, and the creator of a research tool often may
not use or be equipped to use that tool to develop a commercial
application. Thus, providing title to an invention created with gov-
ernment funding may be unnecessary for the continued
commercialization of the research tool itself. Furthermore, the li-
censor's rights are still protected and should be protected enough
to allow continued investment in the development of research
tools. The license is to be used whenever the licensor is engaged in
behavior that unfairly stifles innovation and only when the licensor
refuses to join a patent pool. In addition, the licensor is still enti-
tled to recover royalties.
This Article is comprised of eleven parts. Part I provides
definitions for research tools and commercial applications. Part II
discusses the costs, benefits, and purposes of patent law. Part III
reviews university and private research and development, including
the influence of the Bayh-Dole Act. Part IV examines the
29. See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
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development of commercial applications of biotechnology
research, including the role of venture capital and the use of
licensing provisions requiring reach through royalties and
exclusivity. Parts V and VI evaluate problems that may occur in
attempting to develop commercial applications and licensing
patents. Part VII reviews the Tragedy of the Anticommons theory.
Part VIII discusses research and analysis concerning the existence
of the anticommons problem. Part IX and X examine and analyze
potential solutions for solving the Tragedy of the Anticommons in
biotechnology. Finally, Part XI offers recommendations for
addressing an existing or developing Tragedy of the Anticommons.
I. DEFINING RESEARCH TOOLS AND
COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS
Developments in molecular biology in the last decade have in-
creased our understanding of the cause and development of
incurable diseases, thus enabling us to develop products and ser-
vices for the treatment of those diseases. The nature of the
development of those products and services, however, is increas-
ingly cumulative and collaborative due to the complex and
uncertain nature of biotechnology research and development.
30
Increasing numbers of so-called research tools are needed to de-
velop much needed products and services that will directly impact
the health of the public. Because most of these research tools are
patentable, a "patent thicket" could arise to retard innovation and
the subsequent development of publicly beneficial commercial ap-
plications. "The term 'patent thicket' has been coined to
characteri[z]e a technological field where multiple patent rights
are owned by multiple actors.3' The numerous rights that may need
to be brought together for work in this field might possibly impede
research and development because of the difficulty or cost of as-
sembling the necessary rights.,
32
This Article distinguishes between commercial applications and
research tools. However, from the perspective of the developer of
the product or service, the definitions of commercial applications
30. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 2, p. 17 ("Innovation is often an ongoing, cumu-
lative process, with each generation of innovations building on what came before.").
31. OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 92.
32. Id.
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and research tools can differ."1 Both the fact that research tools
may be developed by the same entity that is developing a commer-
cial application and the fact that research tools may be developed
by public entities as well as private entities complicate the distinc-
tion. An additional complication exists because research tools may
be included in the commercial application sold to the end-user.
For purposes of this Article, a commercial application includes a
pharmaceutical drug, a gene therapy, or a diagnostic product.
Meanwhile, "[a] research tool is a technology that is used by phar-
maceutical and biotechnology companies to find, refine, or
otherwise design and identify a potential product or properties of a
potential drug product. As such, it serves as a springboard for fol-
low-on innovation."04 The main distinguishing characteristic
between a commercial application, thus defined, and a research
tool is the market for the product or service." Though the market
for research tools consists of public and private scientists who use
16
those tools in the development of products and services, the mar-
ket for commercial applications consists of the general public.
Some examples of research tools include a fragment of a gene, a
gene, "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models,
growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones
and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment
and machines." 7 Research tools are critical to the efficient devel-
opment of commercial applications, especially pharmaceutical
drugs.3" Research tools can greatly reduce the "costs and time
required for the clinical trial phases, which are the most 'expensive
part' of the drug development process."39
33. NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
34. FFC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 3, p. 18.
35. Id.
36. See Genomania Meets the Bottom Line; GenomicsforProfit, 291 SCIENCE 1193 (2001)
[T]oolmakers ... sell the machines, chemicals, chips, and computer codes that make
it possible to sequence raw DNA, characterize gene expression, and search for mean-
ingful patterns in the data. Among these are Affymetrix..., which makes gene chips
that give researchers the ability to screen the activity of scores of genes at a time, se-
quencing machine-maker Applied Biosystems ... , and bioinformatics software
developer Informax ....
Id.
37. Sharing Biomedical Research Resources: Principles and Guidelines for Recipients
of NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999).
38. FrC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 3, p. 1 9 ("[R]esearch tools have led to a consider-
able reduction in the cost and time required for the targeting of therapeutic antibodies
during the initial stages of new drug research.").
39. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 3, p. 20.
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Examples of commercial applications include gene therapies,
diagnostic products, and pharmaceutical drugs. Gene therapy in-
volves replacing malfunctioning genes, which can cause diseases,
with functioning genes." Genetic diagnostic testing can include:
"diagnosing a disease; providing prognostic information; permit-
ting early intervention in asymptomatic, high-risk individuals;
predicting the future risk of disease; and designing patient-specific
therapeutic regimens."4' The production of human insulin to treat
diabetes is an example of a drug created through the use of re-
combinant DNA technology.42 "During its first two decades of
existence, the biotechnology industry created more than 75 FDA-
approved drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests that have completely
changed the practice of medicine and generated billions in sales
revenues.43
II. COSTS, BENEFITS, AND PURPOSES OF PATENT LAW
The United States Constitution allows Congress to enact patent
law for the purpose of promoting scientific progress." In the
evaluation of how patents promote scientific progress, courts and
commentators have focused on several theories: an incentive to
invent, an incentive to disclose, and an incentive to innovate. 45 The
incentive to invent rationale focuses on the patent grant as provid-
40. Human Genome Project Information, available at http://www.ornl.gov/
TechResources/Human-Genome/elsi/patents.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Human Genome Project Information]; Gene Medication
or Genetic Modification? The Devil is in the Details, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 11, 1280 (No-
vember 2000).
41. Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome, Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the Future of
Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TFx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 228 (2003). Once a gene or several
genes are discovered which predispose a person to a certain disease, complementary gene
tests are created to determine whether people have that gene or genes. See Human Genome
Project Information, supra note 40.
42. Mary Breen Smith, Comment, An End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome Project
Versus the United States Patent and Trademark Office's 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L. REv.
747, 753 (2002).
43. Cynthia Robbins-Roth, Buy or Die, FORBES ASAP, Apr. 3, 2000, at http://
www.Forbes.com/asap/2000/0403/153.html (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1025-26; see also Dam,
supra note 9, at 248 ("[Patent] law is based squarely on an economic policy articulated in the
Constitution.").
45. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1036-37. Courts have primarily focused on the first
two theories: an incentive to invent and incentive to disclose. See id.
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ing encouragement for developers to invent.4 6 The incentive to dis-
close theory promotes scientific progress by ensuring that the
patented invention is publicly disclosed, enabling someone skilled
in the art to practice the invention. 7 The incentive to innovate
theory focuses on how patent rights encourage commercialization
or development after the patent issues.4 Each theory has been sub-
stantially discussed and criticized in economics literature.4 9 The
analysis below will discuss each theory and several criticisms of the
theories.
A. Incentive to Invent
The creation or invention of new knowledge is economically
beneficial because it leads to the production of new products or
processes.' ° However, in a competitive market system, the public
goods nature of knowledge leads to a market failure.5 Because a
public good is nonrival in consumption and is nonexcludable, an
inventor may bear the costs to develop an invention but may be
unable to recoup the investment made in research and develop-
ment of the invention. 52 Others can easily free-ride on the efforts of
the inventor without having incurred the costs of invention. This
problem leads to a competitive market system that may provide
46. See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
49. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1024-30 (discussing criticisms of theories).
50. See Dam, supra note 9, at 252 ("In high-technology industries ... investment in re-
search and development is itself a major form of competition and leads directly to consumer
benefits in the form of new products and lower prices."); Corrine Langinier & GianCarlo
Moschini, The Economics of Patents: An Overview, (Center for Agricultural and Rural Devel-
opment, Iowa State University, Working Paper, February 2002), at http://
www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_-2061.pdf (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
51. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 7; See also David, supra note 18, at 2 ("[I]t
follows from the nature of pure public goods that competitive market processes will not do an
efficient job of allocating resources for their production and distribution, simply because
where such markets work well they do so because the incremental costs and benefits of using
a commodity are assigned to the users.").
52. Id. A public good has two characteristics: it is nonrivalrous, meaning that one
person's use of the good does not affect the amount of it available for consumption by
others; and it is nonexcludable, meaning that it is impossible to exclude others from using
the public good once it is available. Id at 1. See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND
ANTITRUST 1.1 (2003).
53. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 288.
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ineffective incentives to invent and, thus, too few inventions.M
From an economic perspective, the patent system is designed to
correct this market failure by awarding a property right in a discov-
ery, allowing inventors or innovators to exclude others from
making, using, or selling their discoveries. 55 The patent system
generally is designed to increase consumer and public welfare by
encouraging inventors to create inventions that otherwise would
not have been created because of the market failure discussed
above.58
There are, however, costs associated with providing proprietary
rights in discoveries. 57 The potential monopoly power that a patent
provides allows the patentee to increase a patented invention's
price beyond the competitive market price, thus reducing the sup-
ply of the patented invention." Moreover, it is unclear whether it is
"necessary to endure the output-restricting effects of patent mo-
nopolies in order to stimulate invention." 5 A desire to obtain a
competitive advantage by being first in the market or to keep up
with the progress of competitors may provide sufficient incentive
to invent.60 Moreover, market barriers to entry unrelated to patents
may insulate the inventor from competition long enough to justify
expenditures in research and development.
6 1
54. See Dam, supra note 9, at 247 ("[Tlhe primary problem that the patent system
solves -often called the 'appropriability problem'-is that, if a firm could not recover
the costs of invention because the resulting information were available to all, then we could
expect a much lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation."); Langinier & GianCarlo,
supra note 50, at 3; Yusing Ko, Note, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102
YALE L.J. 777, 791-92 (1992).
55. See Dam, supra note 9, at 247 ("[T]he patent system prevents others from reaping
where they have not sown and thereby promotes research and development ... investment
in innovation. The patent law achieves this laudable end by creating property rights in in-
ventions.").
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The United States Constitution provides Congress the
"[p]ower to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
Id.
57. See David, supra note 18, at 2 ("But imposing restrictions on the uses to which ideas
may be put also saddles society with the inefficiencies that arise when monopolies are toler-
ated; a point harped upon by economists ever since Adam Smith.").
58. JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAw, 20 (2003); Dam, supra
note 9, at 248 ("[Slince patent law gives the patentee the power to exclude others from
practicing the invention, a monopoly may be created, leading to restriction of production, a
supracompetitive price, and what economists call an efficiency or deadweight loss.").
59. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1026.
60. Id. at 1026-27; Ko, supra note 54, at 792.
61. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1027. Contra Ko, supra note 54, at 794 (arguing that
"[t]ypical non-patent means of appropriation," such as head start, trade secrets, sales and
service efforts, are unreliable nonpatent barriers in the biotechnology industry).
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Generally, only the inventor firm can obtain a patent for its
discovery; the competing firms will not receive a patent even
though they may have invested considerable sums of money
attempting to win the race to invent.62 Accordingly, the benefit to
society of having the invention is dissipated "by the cost of
numerous, redundant, development efforts." 63 Moreover, patents
might cause rivals seeking to solve the same problem to waste
resources by either moving faster than necessary to invent first or
duplicating research efforts.64
Additional costs may include the presence of patents that dis-
courage others from improving patented inventions.65 This
problem is exacerbated where a questionably invalid patent has
been issued.66 Alternatively, patents may also encourage inventor
attempts to design around patents, thus yielding inventions serving
the same purpose as the patented invention.6 Furthermore, com-
petitors might become concerned about potential patent
infringement, or even the threat of patent infringement, which can
lead to conduct that wastes resources.68
B. Incentive to Disclose
The patent system provides another benefit in that it increases
the storehouse of public knowledge by requiring a patentee to
provide a disclosure, which enables others to make and use the
patented invention without undue experimentation. 69  This
62. MUELLER, supra note 58, at 20-21. See generally Matthew Erramouspe, Staking Patent
Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards and Rent Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961
(1996) (arguing patent system's mechanisms to minimize rent dissipation, but those mecha-
nisms appear to be failing in race to find and claim commercially valuable genes). Contra
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305, 308
(1992) (reviewing rent dissipation theory and how cases appear to have adopted rules of
decision that minimize rent dissipation in the pioneer development stage as well as in the
improvement stage).
63. Grady & Alexander, supra note 62, at 308.
64. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1027.
65. Id.
66. MUELLER, supra note 58, at 20-21.
67. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1027-28.
68. MUELLER, supra note 58, at 20-21. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 2, p. 8
("The threat of being sued for infringement by an incumbent-even on a meritless claim-
may 'scare... away' venture capital financing.").
69. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 (2000); MUELLER, supra note 58, at 20; Eisenberg, supra
note 10, at 1027. See also Ko, supra note 54, at 796 (arguing that the incentive to disclose
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enabling disclosure is generally made publicly available eighteen
months after a patent application is filed. 70 "[P]atents create legal
rights that permit disclosure, enabling sales negotiations or
licensing of the patented product or technology., 71 Accordingly,
the public can access the information in the application or in the
issued patent, which otherwise might have been kept secret.12
Some critics object to this theory because "[s] ecrecy is not always
a practical strategy for protection, and often secret technologies
can eventually be uncovered through reverse engineering."
73
Moreover, it may be more desirable to keep an invention perpetu-
ally secret, rather than settling for twenty years of patent
protection.74 Finally, critics also claim that patents do not provide
sufficient information to competitors. 5 If an invention is kept se-
cret, it may be difficult to detect infringement of the patent.
7
1
Accordingly, an inventor might prefer to conceal an invention
rather than allow competitors to secretly practice the invention.
C. Incentive to Innovate
Patents also provide an incentive to "induce firms to invest in
'innovation'-i.e., putting existing inventions to practical use.,
77
Significant investment may be required to bring a patentable in-
vention to market, whether those costs include constructing a new
plant, advertising, or distribution.7 8 "[T]he incentive to innovate
theory gives existing patents an ongoing role in preserving the in-
centives of patent holders to invest in development during the
patent term., 79 The patent provides a basis for possibly earning
more than ordinary returns, permitting "innovators to secure the
financial backing of capitalists and to bid productive resources
theory holds that without patent protection, inventors would conceal their inventions in
order to prevent exploitation by competitors).
70. MUELLER, supra note 58, at 22.
71. Ko, supra note 54, at 796.
72. MUELLER, supra note 58, at 21.




77. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1036-37.
78. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1037; Ko, supra note 54, at 799.
79. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1038. ("Reducing the strength of existing patent mo-
nopolies might thus have the effect of undermining incentives to put existing technologies
into use.").
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away from their current uses."80 This theory is usually associated
with the work of Joseph Schumpeter on economic development."'
In contrast to the other two theories, the incentive to innovate
theory is concerned with ex post activity.
82
The patent system arguably provides an additional benefit when
a broad patent is issued for a pioneering development, because the
patentee is able to efficiently direct multiple firms to allocate re-
sources to develop follow-on innovations.8 3 "The patent owner is
thus in a position to cause researchers to share information and
thereby avoid duplicative research efforts., 84 This theory is known
as the "prospect theory.
" 5
III. UNIVERSITY AND PRIVATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE INFLUENCE or THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
Since the 1980s, biotechnology research and development have
increasingly become a collaborative effort between the public and
private sector.86 A primary reason for increased collaboration in-
volves the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, a major shift in
government policy.87 The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to take
title to inventions developed with government funding.8
The Bayh-Dole Act has a tremendous effect upon the appropria-
tion of technology because the federal government is the largest
source of funding for research and development in the United
80. Id. at 1039.
81. Id. But see Ko, supra note 54, at 800 ("Empirical studies testing Schumpeter's as-
sumption-that monopolistic conditions created by patents more readily induce innovation
than do competitive conditions-have proved inconclusive.").
82. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1038.
83. Kitch, supra note 10, at 266. But c.f Ko, supra note 54, at 803 ("Biotechnology's un-
predictability confounds the prospect theory's central notion of coordination.").
84. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1041-42.
85. Kitch, supra note 10, at 266. But c.f Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843-44 (1990) ("Without exten-
sively reducing the pioneer's incentives, the law should attempt at the margin to favor a
competitive environment for improvements, rather than an environment dominated by the
pioneer firm. In many industries the efficiency gains from the pioneer's ability to coordinate
are likely to be outweighed by the loss of competition for improvements to the basic inven-
tion.").
86. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 11.2.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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States for universities. 9 The federal government currently spends
about twenty-six percent of the total funding for research and de-
velopment in the United States.0 The government spends almost
sixty percent of all funding for research and development in uni-
versities in the United States. 9' Private industry funds about seventy-
six percent of research and development in the United States.92
Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, less than four percent of
all government funded research was commercialized.93
As a result of the increased collaboration, the Association of
University Technology Managers reported in 2000 that "$29.5 bil-
lion was spent in sponsored university research expenditures-this
included $18.1 billion from the federal government and $2.7 bil-
lion from private industry"; and sponsored research yielded
"13,032 new technology disclosures; 6,375 new U.S. patent applica-
tion filings; 3,764 U.S. patents issued; 4,362 new options and
licenses granted-50 percent of all options licenses granted were
exclusive licenses[,] 454 of all options and licenses were granted to
new start-ups; $1.3 billion adjusted gross income was generated."9 4
The Association of University Technology Managers also reported
that "347 new products resulting from academic research were in-
troduced in 2000[,] and in 1999[,] university-private industry
collaboration contributed $41 billion to the United States econ-
omy, supporting 270,000 jobs and producing $5 million in tax
revenue.
95
Although there are apparently benefits to the increased collabo-
ration of universities and the private sector, there are critics to
89. Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Val-
ues and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 187, 193
(Winter 2002) (citing NAT'L Sci. BD., National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2000 Data Update,
Table IA, at http://www.nsf.gov/sbel.srs/nsfl01309/start.htm) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
90. ALBERT H. TEICH, AAAS REPORT XXVII: RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, R&D IN THE
FEDERAL BUDGET: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2003) available at http://




93. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 11.12 (citing Lobenstein, Future of University-Industry Li-
censing, 25 LES NOUVELLES 138 (1990)).
94. Id. at §§ 11.36-37. (citing BERNMEN & DENIS, UNIVERSITY LICENSING TRENDS AND
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, BIOTECHNOLOGY LAw 2002: BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS & BUSINESS
STRATEGIES 551 (PLI 2002)).
95. Id. at § 11.16 (citing BERNMEN & DENIS, UNIVERSITY LICENSING TRENDS AND IN-
TELLECTUAL CAPITAL, BIOTECHNOLOGY LAw 2002: BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS & BUSINESS
STRATEGIES 551 (PLI 2002)).
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collaboration.9 6 Some critics state that the purpose of commercial-
izing university research is in direct conflict with the purpose of
university research: to seek knowledge.9 7 Other critics argue that
the collaboration will unduly influence the academic freedom of
researchers to pursue whatever projects they deem important,
which traditionally have centered on basic research-research
geared toward understanding fundamental principles. 98 Instead,
universities and their researchers will be swayed by desires for fi-
nancial gain and might thus focus on applied research. 9  Moreover,
the desire to obtain proprietary rights in technology in the private
sector conflicts with traditional academic goals of immediate pub-
lication and dissemination of research.'00 The private sector might
encourage academics to withhold publication and dissemination of
research until proprietary rights are established in that research.'0 '
As a result, there may be too little basic research available for other
researchers to build upon.102
Proponents of increased collaboration argue that notwithstand-
ing thee above-stated criticisms, universities and private industry
benefit from the relationship.0 3 For example, universities have a
new source of funding to support increasingly expensive high-
technology research.' 4 Moreover, financial benefits may encourage
researchers to remain at universities rather than leaving for private
companies. 00 In addition, university research students may receive
valuable practical training and employment opportunities with pri-
vate firms.0 6 Private industry might also benefit from increased
competition in new technologies, objectivity in research with access
to better research talent and facilities, and opportunities to hire
highly qualified research students."'
96. Id. at § 11.3.
97. Id.
98. Id. at § 11.7.
99. Id.
100. Id. at §§ 11.7-8.
101. Id.
102. Id. at § 11.8.
103. Id. at §§ 11.3-6.
104. Id. at §§ 11.9-.16 ("[A]t around the same time that Congress enacted legislation
permitting universities to retain title to inventions generated by federally-funded research,
the amount of federal research funding available to universities began to decrease." Id. at




107. Id. at §§ 11.9-10.
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A. The Bayh-Dole Act
The issue of whether title to inventions created with government
funding should vest in the government or private companies has
been debated since the 1940s.0 ° In 1947, the United States Attor-
ney General recommended that the ownership of technology
developed with the use of government funds, even in collaboration
with private firms, should vest in the government. 1°9 However, each
agency instituted its own policies concerning the rights the gov-
ernment retained in technology developed with the use of
government funds. ° In 1963, a presidential memorandum at-
tempted to achieve a greater degree of uniformity in government
patent policy."' The memorandum allowed the government to
generally retain title to inventions developed with the use of gov-
ernment funds but also allowed contractors to acquire rights
greater than exclusive licenses if "necessary... to call forth private
risk capital and expense to bring the invention to the point of
practical application." 12 In 1971, President Nixon issued a revised
presidential memorandum and policy statement on government
patent policy, which facilitated the allocation of exclusive rights in
government funded inventions to private firms.'
3
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the federal government
recognized that significant investment was needed to commercialize
innovations developed with government funds and that private firms
were unwilling to invest in commercializing innovations unless those
firms received a proprietary interest in the end product.1 14 Thus, the
108. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671-1691 (1996).
109. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 14.4. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT, INVESTIGATION OF
GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1947)); see Eisenberg, supra note 108, at
1676-77 ("Agencies ... had considerable discretion to choose whatever patent policy best
suited their missions. Not surprisingly, there was considerable variation in the policies
adopted by the different agencies.").
110. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 14.4.
111. Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1677.
112. Id. at 1678.
113. Id. at 1684.
114. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 14.4; Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1689 ("Further sup-
port for legislation to promote the private appropriation of government-sponsored research
results came from the Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation, initiated by Presi-
dent Carter in 1978 to identify and recommend Government actions to encourage increased
industrial productivity and innovation."). Id. at 1669.
[VOL. 38:1
FALL 2004] The Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation 159
government determined that technology developed with
government funds should be transferred to the private sector for
further research, development, and investment to commercialize
that technology."5 The new strategy served several goals: "ensure
[the] effective transfer and commercial development of discoveries
that would otherwise languish in government and university
archives"; "reinvigorate U.S. industry by giving it a fresh infusion of
new ideas that would enhance productivity and create new jobs";
and "ensure that U.S.-sponsored research discoveries were
developed by U.S. firms, rather than by foreign competitors who
had too often come to dominate world markets for products based
on technologies pioneered in the United States."1 6  The
government's policy shift concerning the commercialization of
innovations resulted in changes in government practices and the
law."
7
The Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, known as the Bayh-
Dole Act, went into effect in 1981." 8 The Act concerned the owner-
ship of technology developed with the use of federal funds by small
businesses, universities, research institutions, nonprofit scientific or
educational institutions, and hospitals." 9 The purpose of the Bayh-
Dole Act was "to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research and development, to encourage the
maximum protection of small business firms ... [, and] to pro-
mote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations including universities .... By presidential memo-
randum in 1983, the government extended the Act to entities such
as large corporations.
2 '
[F]urther investment is necessary to refine it, test it, build the necessary facilities for
production on a commercial scale, and find or create a market for it. Throughout this
development process a substantial risk of failure remains. These follow-on investments
may greatly exceed the value of the initial investment that created the invention in in-
choate form. The government lacks the expertise and facilities to do this development
work itself, and therefore needs to turn the invention over to industry at this point.
Firms may only be willing to invest in the development of an invention if they hold ex-
clusive rights, either in the form of title or an exclusive license, under a patent.
Id. at 1669.
115. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 14.4.
116. Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1664-65.
117. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at §§ 14,4-.5.
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1994); EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 13.46.1.
119. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 13.46.1.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994); EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at §§ 13.46.1-2.
121. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 13.46.1 (citing President's Memorandum to the Heads
of the Executive Departments and Agencies on Government Patent Policy, 19 WEEKLY
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Although the Act reserves certain rights to the government, the
Act allows a qualifying organization to elect to retain title to any
technology developed with the use of federal funds. 2 The rights
reserved by the government include a non-exclusive right to prac-
tice the invention worldwide 12 3 and limited "march in" rights to
require the granting of a license if the invention is not practiced
within a reasonable time period. 24 The Act also provides that in
"exceptional circumstances" an agency may limit or restrict the
right of a recipient of federal funds to elect title if the agency de-
termines that restriction or elimination of that right will better
promote the policy and objectives of the Act.
25
As a result of the Act, universities are encouraged to take a pro-
prietary position in any technology that is developed with federal
funds. The Act also encourages private commercial organizations
to collaborate with universities funded with federal monies because
those commercial concerns may be able to take an exclusive pro-
prietary position in that technology. The number of patent
applications filed by qualifying biotechnology organizations in-
creased by more than 300 percent in the first five years after the
enactment of the legislation, as compared with the five years prior
COMP. PREs. Doc. 252 (Feb. 18, 1983)). The Act was originally intended to benefit small
firms which were viewed as:
innovative, adaptive, risk-taking, entrepreneurial and competitive, yet consistently
underrated by funding agencies in their allocations of research dollars and patent
rights. Large business, by contrast, was pictured as short-sighted, risk-adverse, and
predatory, more likely to suppress new technologies than to adopt them, yet savvy and
powerful in their dealings with government agencies and therefore more successful
than their more worthy small business competitors in garnering government research
contracts and securing patent rights in the results.
Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1696.
122. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 13.46.2.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). "Some grantees have taken the position that the statute
provides protection from infringement only, and have refused to provide samples of the
materials in question to facilitate the actual use." NIH REPORT, supra note 2. It is also not
clear whether the retained license allows the government to authorize use of subject inven-
tions by other recipients of government funding. Id.
124. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c) (2), 203 (1994). The government can only exercise "march-in"
rights if the government fulfills certain requirements: (1) meets the requirements for
"'public use;'" (2)determines that the requirements for public use have not been met;
(3) provides the contractor with an opportunity within a reasonable time to demonstrate
that the license should not be granted. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 14.6.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994). For an extensive discussion of"march in" rights and the
"exceptional circumstances" provisions in the Bayh-Dole Act with proposals for reform, see
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).
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to the passage of the Act.1 26 "[B]iotechnology patent applications
constituted 22 percent of all patent applications filed by these insti-
tutions.",21
B. University Licensing
Most, if not all, universities have developed policies directed
toward research and development collaborations between private
industry and the university. 12 Those policies attempt to strike a
balance between the desire to use university research to bring
products to market, create revenue streams for the university,
which generate additional funding for university research, and
maintain the ability of university researchers to pursue basic
research.1 29 The policies also state the university's stance toward
university-private industry licensing and define the rights and
duties of the inventor, the university, and the outside entity.
2 In
addition to a policy, most universities will establish administrative
procedures for evaluating prospective patented inventions,
obtaining and securing patents and other intellectual property
rights, and transferring rights to entities outside the 
university.1 31
An outside technology transfer firm, a university foundation, or an
"in house" technology transfer office typically do the
administration and transfer of a university's property 
rights.132
Some universities use a combination of those approaches.1 3 An
example of a combination of a university foundation and an
outside technology firm is the Triangle Universities Licensing
Consortium, which manages and negotiates on behalf of Duke
University, the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and
North Carolina State University.
1 3 4
126. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at §§ 13.45-46.
127. Id. (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOP-
MENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT
(OAT 13A) at 337 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office 1987)).
128. Id. at 11-16. For a detailed discussion concerning the Bayh-Dole Act and technol-
ogy transfer offices, see Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization
of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 453 (1997).
129. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at S 11.16.
130. Id. (citing COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PATENTS AND COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES, GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES 8-9 (1985)).
131. Id. at 11-17-18.
132. Id. at 11-18.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 11-23.
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University patent policies often require that the university re-
searcher assign her rights in an invention to the university.
University policies also require the inventor or discoverer to dis-
close most potentially patentable inventions or discoveries to the
appropriate administrative body, which will evaluate the patentabil-
ity of any such invention or discovery.1 3 6 Policies include provisions
to distribute any income from the licensing and subsequent com-
mercialization of any patented invention between the university
and the inventor. 37 Moreover, though some universities do not re-
quire the disclosure of all inventions or discoveries, the university





The meeting in 1975 between a young venture capitalist and a
researcher at the University of California at San Francisco led to
the formation of Genentech and marked the birth of a new rela-
tionship between venture capital and the biotechnology market.
1 39
Since that time, venture capital has played a significant role in the
development of the biotechnology market.1 40 Venture capital is the
primary source of funding for biotechnology start-ups. 4 1 Venture
capital is defined as high risk financing, generally in the form of
common stock or debentures convertible from common stock, of-
ten provided to companies that do not qualify for other forms of
135. See University of Colorado Patent Policy (December 1997) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); University of Minnesota Patent Policy (October
1986) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Yale University Pat-




138. See University of Minnesota Patent Policy (October 1986) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Yale University Patent Policy (September 1989)
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
139. Terry C. Bradford, Evolving Symbiosis-Venture Capital and Biotechnology, 21 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 983 (September 2003).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 984 ("[B]iotechnology has been and will remain the mainstay that defines US
VC high-risk, high-return investment."); Mary Breen Smith, Comment, An End to Gene Pat-
ents? The Human Genome Project Versus the United States Patent and Trademark Office's 1999 Utility
Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 747, 758 ("A start-up biotechnology or genomics company,
not having any profits with which to fund development, is dependent on outside capital.").
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financing. 4 2 Venture capitalists generally require a potential for
exceptionally high rates of return in exchange for funding.
4
3
Once a company establishes that a market is valid and impor-
tant, a key factor to venture capitalists in determining whether to
invest in a company includes the company's ability to defend its
market advantage in technology through patents.144 The patent po-
sition of a biotechnology company may determine whether that
company will close its doors or continue in business.4 "5
Generally, small biotechnology start-up companies do not plan to
use the technology that they develop.4 6 Often, the small start-up
companies do not have the expertise or funds necessary to bring a
product to market, especially considering the expensive and
time-consuming clinical trials involved.' 47 Thus, most start-up
142. STEPHEN C. BLOWERS ET AL., GUIDE TO THE IPO VALUEJOURNEY 284 (1999).
143. Id.
144. FrC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 2, p. 1 ("Biotechnology start-ups rely on their
ability to patent their innovations to attract investment and continue innovating."); see Re-
becca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs
Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 477, 479 (2003) ("Biotech
firms say that they need patents in order to raise capital from investors to conduct their
research and in order to get pharmaceutical firms to partner with them to use their research
platforms to develop new products.").
145. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 3, p. 18. ("The venture capital accessed through
patents thus enables not-yet-profitable companies to 'sustain ... innovation through massive
investments in research and development.'"); Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1039 ("[T]he
prospect of earning more than an ordinary return permits innovators to secure the financial
backing of capitalists and to bid productive resources away from their current uses."); Leh-
man, supra note 7, at 50 (1996):
[P]atenting is a very important part of commercializing biotechnology. The biotech-
nology industry requires considerable capital expenditure, not only for the initial
research and development, but also to go through the regulatory approval process
necessary to get a product-particularly a pharmaceutical product-on to the mar-
ket. That capital is essential and the ability to get that capital is very much dependent
upon the capacity to get patent protection for a prospective product.
Id.
146. HAROLD EINHORN & THOMAS J. PARKER, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS 6A-3
(Release no. 59, April 2004).
147. See id.; Biotech Strategies, at http://practice.findlaw.com/feature-0104.html (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform):
On the R&D side, life science companies have long lead times and large development
costs to get the drugs and products from the research and development stage to
market. Unlike other industries, most of [sic] drugs must endure huge clinical trials
and obtain FDA approval before the product can even be marketed. Most smaller
start up companies simply do not have the financial resources to even complete the
development process. Thus, they and [sic] are required to partner with other
companies even to get the technology required to finish their R&D. ... [O]n the
distribution side, once the product is developed, most smaller companies do not have
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biotechnology companies seek to license their technology to large
pharmaceutical companies.
14
From 1999 to 2002, venture capitalists invested over $8.5 billion
in biotechnology companies. 149 After the burst of the Dot Com
bubble, conventional wisdom suggested that venture capitalists
were no longer investing in biotechnology. 50 However, through the
first half of 2003, venture capitalists invested $1.177 billion in bio-
technology.'5' In fact, the total number of deals has remained
constant despite the relative weakness in the United States econ-
152omy.
V. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS IN LICENSES
OF RESEARCH TOOLS
A large part of the biotechnology industry concerns the
development of commercial applications through the use of
research tools. 15  Research tools can be developed in-house by a
company, acquired by purchasing the assets of a company, or
licensed.' However, the cost involved in developing research tools
in-house or acquiring the assets of a company can be very high.'5"
Licensing is the most cost-effective method of acquiring the rights to
the resources for the large-scale commercialization that needs to happen. The
distribution channels are controlled by a few large companies that have access to the
hospitals through purchasing organizations, doctors, offices[,] and pharmacies
around the country.
Id. See generally Phillipe Ducor, New Drug Discovery Technologies and Patents, 22 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & ThcH. LJ. 369 (1996) (describing drug development process).
148. EINHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-3. "[L]icenses are merely instruments
through which the licensee receives from the licensor, for an agreed upon consideration,
the right to enjoy something the licensor has the right to grant, without interference by the
licensor." EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 1.1.
149. Bradford, supra note 139, at 983.
150. d at 984.
151. Id at 983.
152. Id. at 984.
153. EINHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-9.
154. Id.
155. Id. Notably, a patent need not be issued at the time of execution of a license.
EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 3.4. Moreover, assuming there is a patent, most patent license
agreements do not only include the licensed patent. See id. at § 3.3. It is beneficial to the
licensor to structure the agreement as a transfer of information and technical assistance that
includes the patent rights to reduce the chances that a licensee may successfully attack the
agreement on the basis of fraud in the inducement, mistake, failure of consideration, and
patent validity. Id
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use a research tool. 5 6 Licensing can be defined as a waiver of the
right to exclude the licensee from practicing the claimed
invention. 15 However, as discussed below, there are numerous
issues involved in the licensing of research tools that may lead to
an inefficient or ineffective use of the tools, or even a Tragedy of
the Anticommons. 8 Two important provisions in licenses of
research tools concern the valuation of the research tool and the
nature of the exclusivity of the license.
A problem that arises in licensing research tools is determining
the value of the research tool.59 This problem exists because at the
time of licensing the research tool it is difficult to accurately gauge
the ultimate value of the product or service developed from use of
the research tool or whether any commercial application will be
developed at all.' 60 Thus, the cost of the license for the basic re-
search tool is not simply the cost of development of the research
tool; it is also the value of the right to use the technology." The
reach-through royalty provision is a common remedy in research
tool licensing agreements .16' The reach-through royalty provision
usually allows a licensor to capture a percentage of the sales of the
commercial application developed from use of the research tool,
even though the commercial application does not per se include
the licensed patented technology.
63
A problem may arise in the development of a new commercial
application if it is necessary to use multiple research tools, each of
which requires a different license with a separate reach-through
156. EINHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-9.
157. BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD & DENNIS P. O'REILLY, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREE-
MENTS 14 (1998).
158. See infra notes 208-31 and accompanying text.
159. EINHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-9. "The value to a licensee of research
tools lies, in part, in the point at which those tools are employed in the drug development
continuum. A research tool enabling the identification of a drug candidate during high
throughput screening, for instance, may supply more value to the ultimate invention than a
research tool used to confirm an already recognized drug candidate's safety or efficacy."
Integra, 331 F.3d at 871.
160. EINHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-9.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 6A-10; see Stephen G. Kunin et al., Reach Through Claims in the Age of Biotech-
nology, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 609, 618 (2002) ("For example, an agreement might specify that
the supplier of a new receptor will provide the receptor to a researcher for use in seeking
new hormones so long as the supplier receives reach-through royalties on any new hormone
discovered or invented by the researcher.").
163. Id.; see Mueller, supra note 23, at 61 ("The premise underlying reach-through royal-
ties is that the true value of the patented research tool will be determined by the ultimate
marketplace success of the new product developed through use of the tool.").
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royalty clause. 164 The royalties assigned to various licensors may se-
verely erode profit potential, creating a disincentive for companies
that require numerous research tools to develop specific commer-
cial products or services. 16 5 Moreover, a company might abandon
developing a commercial product or service that proves unprofit-
able or not profitable enough for that particular company to
continue developing. Some firms have attempted to overcome this
problem with a clause that places a ceiling on the total amount of
reach-through royalties collected to develop a particular commer-
cial application. 16 Thus, "[i]f a third party royalty must be paid,




A second important issue in the licensing of biotechnology re-
search tools concerns the licensee's desire to obtain some
exclusivity in the technology.16s Exclusivity of a research tool pro-
vides a competitive advantage to the licensee.6 0 Exclusivity allows
the licensee to prohibit a potential competitor from using the
same research tool. " Exclusivity can take the form of exclusive use
of the research tool in a specific niche market or particular field of
use. 1' If an exclusive license is granted to the licensor, other parties
who need to use that research tool may be prohibited from using
that tool. i'7  A potential problem is that the party best situated to
develop a commercial product from the research tool may not pos-
sess the rights to use that tool.1" 3 Because of reach-through
royalties, however, the licensor has an incentive to license the re-
search tool to the party that is best positioned to develop a
particular commercial application. Although the licensor may not
be paid until the commercial application is sold, it is not uncom-
mon for licenses to include positive or negative milestone
164. See infra notes 208-31 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
167. Id.
168. EINHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-10.
169. Id. The grant of an exclusive license can raise antitrust concerns. BRUNSVOLD &
O'REILLY, supra note 157, at 19.
170. BRUNSVOLD & O'REILLY, supra note 157, at 18. ("The express grant of an exclusive
license conveys an implied promise by the patent owner not to practice under the patent
and not to grant any further licenses.").
171. EiNHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-10.
172. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 3-16. An exclusive license can take many forms including
a license exclusive to all but the licensee and all other pre-existing licensees, a license pro-
viding exclusive rights limited to a particular territory, a license providing exclusive rights
for a limited period of time, or a hybrid of the above-types of licenses. Id. at 3-16-17.
173. See ROBERT C. MEGANTZ, TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT: DEVELOPING AND IMPLE-
MENTING EFFECTIVE LICENSING PROGRAMS 83 (2002).
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payments or other incentives to ensure that the licensee uses the
research tool to develop a commercial product.1 74 For example, a
licensor might request a higher reach-through royalty rate, mini-
mum royalty rate, or large positive or negative milestone
payments. 75 A licensor might also request that a licensee pay a lar-
ger up-front fee.1
76
Exclusivity, however, as discussed above, also means that the licen-
see will have to pay a premium to obtain exclusive rights.17 The
licensee will have to convince the licensor that she is best positioned
to develop a commercial application from the research tool, because
the licensor can issue multiple non-exclusive licenses to competitors
of the licensee, thus increasing the likelihood that a company will
develop an application. 78 The licensor may receive a lesser reach-
through royalty rate, and negative and positive milestones, but may
increase her chances that a commercial application will be devel-
oped. 79 Moreover, multiple party competition using the research
tool to develop a commercial application may lead to the develop-
ment of a particular application sooner than if only one party were
using the tool.
V. LICENSING PATENTED RESEARCH ToOLS
Part VI discusses various issues arising because of the cumulative
and collaborative nature of the development of commercial appli-
cations in the biotechnology industry. This Part reviews blocking
patents, complementary patents, hold-ups, royalty stacking, and
problems that may arise in licensing patented research tools.
174. A license may also contain a minimum annual royalty provision that allows the li-
censor to terminate the license if minimum royalties are not met or a conversion to a
nonexclusive license provision to protect the licensor. BRUNSVOLD & O'REILLY, supra note
157, at 22-24. However, a termination provision is a very severe sanction, and one that is
likely not to be accepted by a licensor. Id. Moreover, either a duty to provide "best efforts"
will be expressly provided for in the contract or it may be implied in some cases. Id.
175. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 3.17. An additional potential benefit of entering an ex-
clusive license for the licensor is that the costs associated with administering one license are
potentially less than several non-exclusive licenses. Id.
176. EINHORN & THOMAS, supra note 146, at 6A-10.
177. Id.
178. Id. "If, for example, one company has a large market share compared to its com-
petitors in a particular technology field, it may be more profitable to have a single exclusive
license with that company .... For this reason, the licensee may seek an exclusive license
even if it must pay a higher royalty." EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 3.18; MEGANTZ, supra note
173, at 83-84.
179. MEGANTZ, supra note 173, at 83.
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A. Blocking Patents
Blocking patents result from the incremental nature of innova-
tion.18° The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
may grant a broad, pioneer patent."" If a second inventor improves
an invention covered by the first patent, the second inventor may
receive a patent for her invention, assuming her invention fulfills
the requirements for patentability. 2 However, the improvement
patent cannot be practiced without infringing the first patent."'
Similarly, the inventor of the pioneering invention cannot practice
the second inventor's patented invention. The second inventor's
patent blocks the first inventor from practicing the improvement.'
8 5
The improvement patent is deemed the "subservient patent," and
the first patent is the "dominant patent."'86 The first inventor must
obtain a license from the second inventor to practice the im-
provement. The second inventor must also secure a license from
the first inventor to use the improvement.
B. Complementary Patents
Complementary patents cover technology that is useless without
a license to another patented invention. 7 Complementary patents
can occur where different inventors have patented components of
a larger invention.' Absent cooperation between owners of com-
plementary patents, commercial applications may be blocked from
development because of competing patent claims.'9 Thus, to de-
velop a particular commercial application the owners of
180. Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG.
359, 362 (1999).
181. Id. at 364.
182. Id. at 363.
183. Id.; see Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 75 (1994) (discussing the problem of blocking
patents and the reverse doctrine of equivalents as a "judicial response to the likelihood of a
breakdown in bargaining between inventors who pioneer a new technology and those who
later develop key improvements").
184. Carlson, supra note 180, at 363.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 364.
188. Id. at 364-65.
189. Id.
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complementary patents must license their respective rights to one
another or to a third party.
C. Hold-Ups
A hold-up may result if a developer, unaware of a particular pat-
ent, uses the patented technology to create a commercial
application. Assuming, on the other hand, that a developer has
both knowledge of a patent that potentially blocks the creation of a
commercial application and also sufficient lead-time, he may invest
in designing around the patent. '9° Any royalty that the patentee
may exact from the developer is likely slight.19 The patentee is in a
very weak negotiating position; 92 however, if the developer, without
knowledge of the patent, has invested substantial resources in cre-
ating a commercial application using the patented technology, he
is also in a weak negotiating position. 193 The patentee can demand
higher royalties, "very likely backed up with the threat of shutting
down the [developer] if the court finds the patent valid and in-
fringed and grants injunctive relief.", 94 Though the developer
might go back and attempt to redesign the product, to do so
"could well require a major redesign effort and/or cause a signifi-
cant disruption to production," "would still leave potential liability
for any products sold after the patent issued before the redesigned
products are available for sale," "and could present compatibility
problems with other products or between different versions of this
product." 95 For these reasons, the developer is susceptible to being
held up by the patentee. 96 An example of a potential hold-up in
the biotechnology industry includes a developer that uses an al-
ready privately patented gene sequence from a public database.197
190. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cmss Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting6-7, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam Jaffe et al., eds., 2001), avail-
able at http://haas.berkeley.edu/-shapiro/thicket.pdf (on file with the University of







197. Human Genome Project Information, supra note 40. "[A] demand for payment af-
ter lock in can compel the downstream actor to pay the patentee a 'far greater' royalty rate.
That higher rate ... can be passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices. [T]he
threat of hold up may reduce overall levels of innovation, because some companies will
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D. Royalty Stacking
Royalty stacking can occur with blocking or complementary pat-
ent situations. Royalty stacking can arise with blocking patents
where there are multiple layers of improvement on a pioneering
invention. For example, multiple licensees may have a right to a
royalty for every sale of a commercial application.
Complementary patents may also produce a royalty stacking
problem. Royalty stacking can occur when a single genomic
sequence is patented in different ways, for example, when an EST,
a gene, and a SNP are each patented.1 9 Thus, in order to practice a
commercially useful invention, such as gene therapy, which uses
one or several genes, a company will have to obtain multiple
licenses to those patents. '99 The company developing the gene
therapy will likely have to pay royalties to each and every owner of
the patents for each EST, gene, and SNP needed to practice the
therapy.20 0 The value of the commercial development or the
profitability of the commercial development may be substantially
decreased because of the amount of royalties paid for each
research tool, or part of a gene, or several genes used in a
commercial application.0 ' Thus, there may be a disincentive for
companies to research and develop commercial applications in
areas where there is a patent thicket.
Royalty stacking can also occur when a research tool or multiple
tools are needed to conduct research for and development of a
particular commercial application even though the application
does not include the patented research tool or tools. "Stacking
royalty obligations can make a significant dent in the profit expec-
tations of firms that might develop [commercial applications],
thereby undermining the commercial attractiveness of potential
applications.
20 2
'refrain from introducing certain products for fear of holdup.'" FTC REPORT, supra note 1,
at ch. 2, p. 29.
198. Human Genome Project Information, supra note 40, at 8.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. WALSCH ET AL., supra note 14, at 299.
202. NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
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E. Transaction Costs and Impediments
to Efficient Licensing
There are numerous costs associated with licensing patents.
°0 3
For example, there are costs in analyzing what patents apply or
cover a commercial application 20 4 and in determining ownership of
upstream inputs.2" There are also numerous impediments to the
licensing of biotechnology research tools: inexperienced parties
attempting to license patents; differing goals of licensors and licen-
sees, such as universities versus private industry; time constraints,
such as research agendas and funding issues; and difficulty valuat-
ing the research tool. 20 6 Moreover, "uncertainty or disagreement as
to the value of the patented invention, the likely outcome of the
research project, and the validity and scope of the patent claims
might also make it difficult for the parties to agree on a price for a
license."0 7
VII. THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
In 1998, Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg
identified a potential problem involving patents and biomedical
research described as a "Tragedy of the Anticommons. ' '20 8 The
"Tragedy of the Anticommons" theory is a mirror image of the
metaphor "Tragedy of the Commons," which has been used to
explain overpopulation, air pollution, and species extinction.2 9
The Tragedy of the Commons theory states that if people hold
203. Human Genome Project Information, supra note 40, at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This
Market Failing or Emerging? in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223-50 (R.C. Dreyfuss et al., eds., 2001);
Merges, supra note 183, at 89 ("Where high uncertainty attends the valuation of assets to be
exchanged, bargaining can be difficult.").
207. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1073.
208. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 698. For a more detailed analysis of the anti-
commons theory as it applies generally to property, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998). See
also Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 1163 (1999). For a
criticism of the anticommons theory, see Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating
the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman, available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/index.html (2004).
209. Heller& Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 698.
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property in common, and no person has a right to exclude other
persons from using that property, those people tend to overuse the
property because there is no incentive to conserve the property.
210
The solution to the Tragedy of the Commons is to provide private
property rights to individuals using the former commons
property.211 Meanwhile, the Tragedy of the Anticommons theory
holds the opposite: if too many people own private property rights
in a piece of property, then the rights may block one another, and
thus, no one person has an effective right to use the property.
212
This problem leads to under-use of the property.213 Heller and
Eisenberg apply this theory to biomedical research and assert: "[a]
proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be
stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of
research and product development." '14
Heller and Eisenberg believe that an anticommons can arise ei-
ther through "creating too many concurrent fragments of
intellectual property rights in potential future products or by
permitting too many upstream patent owners to stack licenses on
top of the future discoveries of downstream users." 2" Heller and
Eisenberg provide two examples of ways in which the government
might create too many fragments of intellectual property rights in
upstream research. 6 The first involves potential patents in gene
fragments or genes.1 7 The second involves potential patents in
gene receptors, which are useful to screen potential pharmaceuti-
cal products.21 8 In both examples, the developer of a commercially
useful end product, such as therapeutic proteins or genetic diag-
nostic tests, might need to obtain multiple licenses to gene
219fragments, genes, or receptors to use the downstream innovation.
Heller and Eisenberg assert that reach-through royalty license
agreements "may lead to an anticommons as upstream owners
stack overlapping and inconsistent claims on potential downstream
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right to be at the bargaining table as a research project moves
downstream toward product development."
2 2 0
Heller and Eisenberg recognize Coase's theorem, which posits
that, assuming costless transactions, a tragedy can be avoided so
long as people transfer and trade their rights.22' Moreover, the re-
searchers recognize that even in situations without costless
transactions, owners of intellectual property rights have solved po-
tential anticommons problems by bundling licenses to multiple
rights, whether through patent pools or collective rights organiza-
tions such as ASCAP or BMI. 222 However, they argue that because of
transaction costs in bundling rights, strategic behavior, and cogni-
tive biases of the participants involved in the transfer of intellectual
property rights in upstream biomedical research, a tragedy none-
theless may result.
223
Heller and Eisenberg state that some of the difficulties in bun-
dling rights include public institutions with limited resources for
absorbing transaction costs and limited competence in fast-moving,
market-orientated bargaining; difficulties in valuing a diverse set of
techniques, reagents, DNA sequences, and instruments, which can
impede the development of a standard distribution scheme; the
heterogeneity of interests among private and public patent owners
may complicate or defeat attempts to create standard licensing
terms, which may lead to case-by-case negotiation of licensing
terms; and licensing transaction costs may occur at the research
and development stage when it is unclear whether the potential
project will be successful. 24 They also argue that antitrust law may
provide a disincentive for firms to bundle rights through patent
pools.
225
Heller and Eisenberg raise the heterogeneous interests of the
rights holders as another potential impediment to solving the anti-
226commons problem through collective action. They argue that
often private and public rights holders will have different goals in
licensing patents. 227 For example, a public institution may be more
concerned about the widespread dissemination of a publicly bene-
ficial technology, whereas the private institution may be concerned
220. Id.
221. Id. at 698.
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solely with financial gain .2 2 Lastly, they believe that bargaining can
break down between firms that want to bundle their rights because
rights holders will overvalue their discoveries. 29
Heller and Eisenberg conclude that because an anticommons is
likely to arise and endure in biomedical research, "privatization
must be carefully deployed to preserve the public goals of bio-
medical research.,230 They suggest that "[p]olicy-makers should
seek to ensure coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to
minimize restrictive licensing practices that interfere with down-
stream product development.,
231
VIII. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS CONCERNING
THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
This Part describes and analyzes several studies relevant to
whether a Tragedy of the Anticommons exists that impedes bio-
technology innovation. This Part also reviews an example of the
anticommons phenomena in agricultural biotechnology.
A. Report of the NIH Working Group on Research Tools
In response to increasing difficulties in licensing or transferring
proprietary rights in research tools-because owners and users are
unable to agree on fair terms or negotiations are difficult and
cause delays-the NIH formed a Working Group on Research
Tools ("Group").232 The Group was charged to "[i]nquire into
problems encountered by NIH-funded investigators in obtaining
access to patented research tools, including refusals to license, on-
erous royalty obligations, restrictions on the dissemination of
materials and information, restrictions on the ability to collaborate
with commercial firms, and advance commitments regarding intel-
lectual property rights in future discoveries."2 33 The Group was also
directed to "[i] dentify and assess possible NIH responses in light of
the competing interests of intellectual property owners and re-
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 701.
231. Id.
232. NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
233. Id.
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search users and the role of NIH as a public institution and re-
search sponsor."2 3 4 The Group focused its analysis on the terms of
access to research tools in transactions involving NIH grantees.
23 5
The Group examined the issues from the perspective of the three
stakeholders involved in transactions of research tools: bench sci-
entists, university technology transfer office professionals, and
private firms.26
The Group questioned bench scientists who import and export
research tools. 237 The Group found a "rising frustration" among
academic and industry bench scientists concerning delays caused
by negotiating the transfer of IP rights in research when attempt-
ing to import research tools.2 38 In addition, industry scientists
expressed frustration concerning delays in access to research tools
created by NIH-funded or taxpayer-funded research.239 Scientists in
academia and industry would like "access to research tools stream-
lined, expedited, and rationalized.,2 0 Interestingly, bench scientists
who export research tools had two divergent opinions concerning
the ease of access and availability of those research tools. 241 Some
believe that research tools should be readily available and freely
distributed, consistent with their desire for access to the tools that
others have developed.242 Others desire to "capture the market
value of research tools that they have developed for themselves and
their institutions through the terms of patent licenses ....,,24
Moreover, scientists who develop new research tools tend to over-
value those tools, often undervaluing the number of other tools
necessary to research a biological problem.2" Additionally, the
value of a tool is difficult to predict and agree upon.2  There is no
consensus among scientists on how to distribute and value research
tools, leading to increased frustration.2 6
The Group also questioned university technology transfer
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research tools. 2 47 The Group noted that responses focused on
problems of importing research tools from universities and,
particularly, private institutions. Some of those problems include:
increased administrative burden of reviewing and negotiating an
increasing number of transfer agreements; limitations on
publication or dissemination of the results of research;2
49
ownership of or access to rights to future discoveries made when
using the licensed research toos;25 0 restrictions on how research
tools may be used, which may prohibit sharing materials with other
researchers, sending them to other institutions, using them for
commercial purposes, or using them in research that another firm
has funded; 25' and agreements that require universities to
indemnify providers against liability arising from use of research
tools. 52 Notably, the Group found that universities often used
transfer agreements with terms similar to those discussed below
when exporting research tools.
2 53
Finally, the Group questioned private firms concerning access to
research tools. 254 The Group notes that the perspectives of private
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. The Group notes:
Many universities have policies that limit their ability to agree to restrictions on pub-
lication of research results .... Objectionable terms in proposed agreements include:
confidentiality provisions that are so far-reaching in their coverage as to interfere
with effective publication of research results, presentations at conferences, or valida-
tion of results by other investigators; requirements for approval from the provider
prior to submission of manuscripts for publication; and unreasonable delays in publi-
cation .... Some universities will not agree to any restrictions or delays in
publication, but most will agree to delays of 30, 60, or even 90 days to permit the pro-
vider to request deletion of company confidential information that it supplied or to
get a patent application on file.
Id.
250. Id. This is a particularly thorny issue. Id. Universities are confronted with violating
obligations to current and past research sponsors by contracting away rights to future dis-
coveries developed using a proprietary research tool. Id. Moreover, universities "fear that
precommitments to license future discoveries of research tools, interfere with future tech-
nology transfer to other firms, and conflict with the university's stewardship of its inventions
for the public benefit." Id. "Options or rights of first refusal to license future discoveries
raise some of the same problems as precommitted licenses." Id. "Some universities ... mort-
gage their speculative future intellectual property so that the research may go forward, while
others are unable to arrive at mutually agreeable terms and have to tell their scientists to
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firms on the issue of access to research tools differs depending on
the nature of the tool, the relationship between the firm's business
strategy and the tool, and the importance to the firm of university-
based research using the tool."5 Some biotechnology firms hope to
sell pharmaceuticals to consumers, and thus align consumer inter-
ests somewhat with those of pharmaceutical companies.256 However,
other biotechnology firms market and sell research tools to other
firms as part of their business strategy.257 Whether a private firm is
willing to make research tools available to universities or others at
all depends on the competitive advantage that the tool provides to1- 58
the firm. If the firm allows others to license the research tool, it
likely will reserve a high degree of control over dissemination, use,
and disclosure, along with an ability to recover some value in re-
259
turn.
The Group found that private firms realize some benefits in
providing access to research tools.2 6 0 Some of these benefits in-
clude: goodwill developed between the private firm and the public
sector, which may lead to opportunities to collaborate with university
scientists; 26' an opportunity to learn more about the firm's products
from experts in a particular area;262 and discoveries with potential
commercial applications from which a firm might profit.263 The
Group also found that private firms realize risks in providing access
to research tools as well.2  Some of those risks include: their own
proprietary tools might be used in ways to advance the interests of a
competitor, which can include a university scientist with a similar







261. Id. Firms often need to collaborate with the public sector "to further the interests
of their research scientists, to obtain certain research capabilities and expertise, and to stay
abreast of the most important advances in science." Id. Moreover, many firms were birthed
in academia and feel a strong pressure from their scientists to maintain ties to academia. Id.
262. Id. ("Biotechnology firms often have limited internal research capabilities for ex-
ploring the fundamental biology questions related to their products and potential products,
and even large pharmaceutical companies find that academic scientists can sometimes per-
form research that they are not set up to handle in-house.").
263. Id. ("Some firms have not yet obtained a commercially valuable discovery from a
university as a result of providing a research tool, but many firms count this possibility as an
essential quid pro quo for providing their proprietary tools to a university free of charge.").
264. Id.
265. Id. ("People from other firms noted that they had been 'burned' by scientists who
entered into deals with multiple companies. Many firms try to manage this risk by
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that university scientists make using proprietary research tools will
be licensed to competitors of the owner of the tools; 66 losing pro-
prietary rights through disclosure by academics;2 7 and the risk of
liability for harm caused by the use of tools by scientists and institu-
tions that they cannot control .
Additional risks concern specific tools. 269 For example, firms are
concerned about licensing proprietary therapeutic compounds for
scientists to use in research because a university may discover and
patent a new use for the compound, thereby blocking the private
firm's development of the compound.270 Moreover, loss of control
over how the compound is used and what is done with the com-
pound because of concerns related to discovering information
could affect whether the compound receives FDA approval.27'
Firms are also concerned about licensing a research tool such as a
molecule (for example, a receptor) that plays a role in a disease
pathway that is not fully understood, because if the patent on the
molecule itself does not cover the ultimate therapeutic product,
"the firm [may] quickly lose its competitive advantage."
272
The licensing of research tools that may have a broad applica-
tion to many research problems also provides substantial risks to
private firms.273 These risks involve appropriating some value from
licensing that particular tool.2 74 A major risk arises when those tools
are made available to academic researchers, as it may undermine
sales to paying customers by causing them to "use the data gener-
ated by the academic researchers rather than buying the tool for
use in their own internal research.
2 75
The Group noted that private firms concurred in complaining
that a university's position on fair terms of access to research tools
depended on whether the university was importing or exporting






270. Id. ("A typical mechanism for managing this risk is to seek a grant-back of a nonex-
clusive, royalty-free license to any improvements and new uses of the proprietary
materials."). Many firms, however, desire an exclusive license to improvements. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. ("If the firm makes the molecule available to a university scientist, the only way
to ensure that it is not undermining its own proprietary advantage may be to secure some
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tools.2 7 6 As one lawyer for a small biotechnology start-up stated,
"'[u]niversities want it both ways. They want to be commercial
academic environments when it comes to accessing technology
that others have developed.... ,,277 Private firms also complained
that universities distort the value of their research tools and fail to
comprehend the costs and risks related to product development, 278
and are unduly slow and cautious in negotiating deals.279 "Many
companies complained about universities granting exclusive li-
censes for government-funded research tools, arguing that such
tools should be made broadly available on 'reasonable' terms."
2 80
Firms also complained about university demands of shared owner-
ship of future discoveries and reach-through royalties on future
products.2s ' 'Virtually every firm ... believed that restricted access
to research tools is impeding the rapid advance of research and
that the problem is getting worse."
2 2
The Group concluded its analysis by recommending various
steps that the NIH could take to provide greater access to research
tools. 213 These steps include: promotion of "free dissemination of
research tools without legal agreements whenever possible, espe-
cially when the prospect of commercial gain is remote";28
4
promotion of use of the Uniform Biological Materials Transfer
Agreement "and the development of other standard agreements to
reduce the need for case-by-case review and negotiations" ;2s5 devel-
opment and dissemination of "guidelines for recipients of NIH
funds as to what terms are reasonable in licenses and MTAs, ad-
dressing both importing of research tools owned by other
institutions and exporting of research tools created with NIH
funds";2 6 review of "policies with regard to dissemination of re-





280. Id. ("One firm that has long taken the position that research tools should be li-
censed nonexclusively noted that universities seem to be coming around to this view,
although another major pharmaceutical firm observed a growing problem of universities
granting exclusive licenses on research tools to firms that refuse to grant sublicenses.").
281. Id. ("[S]tacking royalty obligations can make a significant dent in the profit expec-
tations of firms that might develop and market the end products themselves, thereby
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funding, and revise and strengthen those policies consistent with
the recommendations in this report";... and promotion of "the es-
tablishment of a research tools forum for the biomedical research
and development community.
2 8s
B. Research Tool Patenting and Licensing
and Biomedical Innovation
In a recent study, Professors Walsh, Arora, and Cohen gathered
information, primarily through interviews with IP attorneys, business
managers, and scientists from ten pharmaceutical firms and fifteen
biotech firms, as well as university researchers and technology trans-
fer officers from six universities, patent lawyers, government and
trade association personnel, and archival data, to analyze how
changes in patenting practices and in the law have affected innova-
tion in the biotechnology sector.89 Their article concludes that
"drug discovery has not been substantially impeded"' 0 regardless of
an increase in the number of patents on research tools in the bio-
technology industry and certain conditions in the biotechnology
industry increasing the likelihood that an anticommons will de-
velop. The article also finds that the patenting of research tools has
not stifled university research. 9' The authors note, "the vast major-
ity of respondents say that there are no cases in which valuable




289. WALSCH ET AL., supra note 14, at 285.
290. Id. at 285, 293-97. The authors argue that several preconditions exist which may
facilitate an anticommons in the biotechnology sector. These conditions are: a rapid growth
of biotechnology patents over the past 15 years; the numbers and diversity of entities in-
volved in the biotechnology sector has grow-n; and the number of patents on research tools
has increased. Id.
291. Id. at 285. The article notes that there is evidence that patents are interfering with
university research with restrictions on the use of patented genetic diagnostics. Id. The arti-
cle also notes that "there is, also, some evidence of delays associated with negotiating access
to patented research tools, and there are areas in which patents over targets limit access and
where access to foundational discoveries can be restricted." Id. at 286. Moreover, university
research is impacted because research is redirected to areas where there does not exist a
thicket of patents. Id.
292. Id. at 286. The authors state that "Although we have no systematic data on projects
never pursued, our findings on the absence of breakdowns is consistent with the notion that
there are relatively few cases where otherwise commercially promising projects are not un-
dertaken because IP on research tools." Id. at 303.
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The authors examined the impediments to drug discovery that
293an anticommons in biotechnology may cause. The authors spe-
cifically examined three potential problems: breakdowns in
negotiations over rights, royalty stacking, and excessive licensing
schemes.294 The authors found no evidence of breakdowns in nego-
tiations concerning the licensing of patent rights that lead to the
end of a research and development effort.
29
1
The authors also found that "royalty stacking did not represent a
significant or pervasive threat to ongoing R&D projects .... Al-
though about half of respondents complained about licensing
costs for research tools, nearly all of those concerned about licens-
ing costs also went on to say that the research always went forward."
296 According to the authors, three primary factors contribute to
the above result: (1) the total amount of royalty or licensing fees
that are accumulated do not result in a project becoming a loss;
(2) if the amount of the royalty or licensing fee does push the pro-
ject into a loss, then the participants will negotiate an off-set to the
royalty amount to allow the project to go forward; and (3) in the
few cases where such a problem might occur, the problem is an-
ticipated.297
Finally, the authors found that the productivity gains from the
licensing of research tools outweighed industry participant concerns
over heightened licensing fees resulting from the boom in the
293. Id. at 297.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 298. The authors note:
Numerous respondents reported that they did not initiate or had dropped projects if
they learned another firm had already acquired a proprietary position on a drug they
were considering developing-that is, on the output of a drug discovery and testing
process. But that is quite different from other firms having IP for the research tools-
the inputs into the discovery process.
Id.
296. Id. at 299. The authors note:
One of our other biotechnology respondents suggested, however, that 'the royalty
burden can become onerous' and that the stacking of royalties 'comes up pretty
regularly now' with the proliferation of IP [, however, even in that case,] respondent
said that no projects had ever been stopped because of royalty stacking .... [Addi-
tionally] one respondent, an IP lawyer,... said that [in cases with too many claimants
of royalty percentages] projects were stopped existed, but client privilege prevented
the respondent from giving details.
Id.
297. Id. at 300.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
patenting of research tools20 The authors also found, however, that
small start-up firms and universities find the licensing fees for
research tools prohibitively expensive.2 99 The authors note that
there are non-economic costs such as publication restrictions for
university researchers.3 °°
The authors distinguish their analysis of the need for multiple
rights to invent a commercially viable product-the anticommons
problem-from the need for a foundational upstream discovery,
e.g., one particular research tool that is critical for the develop-
ment of a commercially viable downstream product.30 1 The authors
examine whether restricted access to a particular research tool,
such as exclusive licensing, provides an obstacle to biotech innova-
302tion. In a National Research Council report titled, "Intellectual
Property Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology," the au-
thors review several examples of situations involving restricted
access. 30 These examples, particularly the polymerase chain reac-
tion ("PCR") technology, CellPro, and the Geron embryonic stem
cell matter, appear to demonstrate that restrictive licensing terms
may reduce access to research tools and impede the development
of commercial products. 4 The authors note, however, that "[ e]ven
where universities employ restrictive licensing terms ... , it is not
clear that such a practice diminishes follow on discovery, at least
when applied to smaller firms.,
30 5
The authors also examine transaction costs related to the in-
creasing number of research tool patents, such as negotiations,
litigation, inventions around patented inventions, overseas re-
search, and the monitoring of the use of a firm's intellectual
298. Id. at 301.
299. Id. at 302. "Some firms (particularly genomics firms) holding rights over research
tools did, however, offer discounted terms for university and government researchers." Id.
300. Id. The authors are unsure of whether these costs apply to license agreements be-
tween industry and university participants concerning inputs to academic research. Id.
301. Id. at 305.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 305-309.
305. Id. at 309. The authors also discuss widespread complaints from universities, bio-
technology firms and pharmaceutical firms over patentholders' assertion of exclusivity over
an important class of research tools, namely 'targets,' which refers to any cell receptor, en-
zyme, or other protein implicated in a disease, thus representing a promising locus for drug
intervention. Id. at 310. While the authors note that they do not have systematic data on the
frequency of the limitations of access to targets, the authors state that "[flrom interviews
and secondary sources ..., we heard of a number of prominent examples of firms' being
accused of asserting exclusivity over (or allowing only limited access to) a target." Id. at 312.
However, the authors report that while there is "some evidence of researchers being ex-
cluded, we do not find a failure to exploit a target." Id. at 314.
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property: The authors report that a third of all respondents
stated that transaction costs cause delays and add to the overall cost
of research . 7 Moreover, the average litigation costs are between
$1-10 million per side and, thus, are likely to be a significant cost
related to licensing patents in the biomedical field. Additionally,
the opportunity costs are likely to be large considering the time-
intensive burden of litigation on firm managers and scientists.
The authors state that for large firms the real out-of-pocket costs
and opportunity costs are low relative to the large firm budget for
research and development. 30 However, the authors note that those
costs for small firms could be a significant burden. 1
The authors report that there is "only limited support for the
idea that negotiations over rights stymie precommercial research
conducted in universities., 312 The authors highlight one notable
exception: "the case of clinical research based on diagnostic tests
using patented technologies."3 1 3 In fact, "one study found that 25
percent of laboratory physicians reported abandoning a clinical
test because of patents."3 1 4 The authors concluded, however, that
while some firms are willing to assert patents against universities
performing patented diagnostic tests and "at least some labs are
stopping their testing as a result," the majority of labs are continu-
ing to test.
The authors review government response and private firm and
university strategies dealing with the relatively high level of pat-
enting of research tools."




308. Id. at 315.
309. Id. The authors also note the significant time loss involved in researching and exam-
ining potentially relevant patents to the proposed research project: "One attorney responsible
for evaluating research tool IP from a large pharmaceutical firm provided estimates for the
time attorneys were occupied with evaluating the IP of third parties and the time associated
with actual negotiations that implied a total of $2 million in annual expenses." Id.
310. Id. at316.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 317.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 318.
315. Id. The authors report that another potential problem includes the costs associated
with delays in negotiating access to research materials or material transfer agreements. Id. at
319. As to that issue, the authors conclude that "to the degree that the patenting of biomedical
discoveries may impose additional costs and delays in material transfers it is largely because
Bayh-Dole and related acts have provided university administrations, and especially their tech-
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Firms often deal with only a handful of patents on inputs. 18 Sec-
ond, firms and universities can often ignore patents, especially
because infringement of research tool patents is difficult to de-
tect. 9 The authors report that some firms may be reluctant to file
patent infringement actions against universities involved in non-
commercial research for fear of low damage awards or negative
320press. Moreover, firms often will not aggressively enforce their
patents because of the cost of litigation.' Third, some firms may
use patented technology offshore to avoid infringement.32 2 Fourth,
some firms may invent-around the claims in the patents. 23 The au-
thors conclude that between contracting and current practices,
"firms were able to greatly reduce the complexity of the patent
landscape."0
24
The authors also review institutional responses by firms, the
NIH, the USPTO, and courts designed to increase access to re-
search tools. 2 5 Firms, along with other institutions, have co-
318. Id. The authors report that,
Several companies with patents on targets noted that, in addition to trying to develop
their own therapeutics, they include the liberal and broad licensing of those targets
to others as part of their business model, reflecting a belief on the part of some hold-
ers of target patents that by giving several firms a nonexclusive license they increase
the chances that one will discover a useful drug .... Liberal licensing practices are
also encouraged to the extent that inventing around tool patents is feasible, ....
fu]nder such circumstances, patentholders are more willing to license on reasonable
terms assuming the prospective user does not invent around to begin with.
Id. at 323.
319. Id. at 324. University researchers often will rely upon a "research exemption," how-
ever, the Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke University has interpreted the exemption very
narrowly. Id at 325 (citing 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, the authors found
that a third of industrial respondents, and all university or government lab respondents,
"acknowledged occasionally using patented research tools without a license, and most re-
spondents suggested that infringement by others is widespread." Id. at 327. Also, researchers
stated that partly because there is a belief that research tools are invalid or very narrow,
researchers would be willing to challenge the patents in court. Id. at 328. Finally, "because of
the long drug development process, the 6-year statute of limitations may expire before in-
fringement is detected." Id.
320. Id. at 325. Moreover, members of the university community may sanction overly
aggressive behavior and are consumers of the products or services of the private firms. Id.
Also, private firms and universities have an incentive to develop good relationships because
of the need to exchange information. Id. However, private firms will enforce their patents
against universities that become competitors. Id.
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sponsored public and quasi-public databases of information.326 The
NIH has championed the cause of obtaining access to research
tools for university scientists.327 The USPTO has heightened the
requirement for satisfying the utility obligation for patentability.
Furthermore, the authors report that respondents cite several re-
cent Federal Circuit cases that have either invalidated research tool
patents or limited the scope of the claims of those patents.
32 9
The authors state that the anticommons has not emerged as es-
pecially problematic.30 The authors also state that access to
foundational upstream discoveries has not yet emerged as a prob-
lem, but there is a prospect that a problem might develop and
"ongoing scrutiny is warranted." 3' Finally, the authors conclude
that "the biomedical enterprise seems to be succeeding, albeit with
some difficulties, in developing an accommodation that incorpo-
rates both the need to provide strong incentives to conduct
research and development and the need to maintain free space for
discovery."
3 32
C. The Preservation of Open Science
Professor David proposes that public policy should ensure that
the Republic of Science and the Regime of Technology remain dis-
tinct and that a productive balance be maintained between them. 3
David criticizes both Walsh's attempt to find evidence of a "Tragedy
of the Anticommons" and Walsh's interpretation of that evi-
dence 3 David asserts that those who desire broader intellectual
property rights should bear the burden to demonstrate that the
expansion of existing rights will not be economically damaging.3 5
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 329.
329. Id. at 330.
330. Id. at 331.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 335-36. The authors note that as technology changes and new court deci-
sions, such as Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), are published, the
issues reviewed in this Article may need to be revisited. WALSCH ET AL., supra note 14, at 336.
333. David, supra note 18, at 5. Professor David makes an important distinction between
"business support for academic style R&D-as distinguished from industrial contracting for
university based applications oriented research with intellectual property rights assigned to
the sponsoring firms .... " Id. at 8.
334. Id. at 15-16.
335. Id. at 16.
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The Republic of Science consists of basic science researchers
who receive funding from public sources searching for knowl-
edge. 36 The Regime of Technology includes private firms that seek
to develop commercial products and acquire proprietary interests
in applied technology. 37 David states that several trends-university
patenting of research tools spurred by the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act, the "concerted effort by all parties to secure copyright
protection for the electronic production and distribution of in-
formation," and "growing efforts to assert and enforce intellectual
property rights over scientific and technological knowledge"-have
given greater control of technology to private interests at the ex-
pense of the public domain.
The conditions that support the Regime of Technology are not
conducive to the development of reliable knowledge. The pur-
pose of the Regime of Technology is to generate stock wealth
through profits from "existing data, information[,] and knowledge,
and therefore requires the control of the knowledge through se-
crecy, or exclusive possession of the right to its commercial
exploitation.
David notes that the following norms govern the Republic of
Science: communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, originality,
3411
and skepticism. 4 These norms recognize that the development of
knowledge is a social process.342 Specifically, knowledge is devel-
oped in a cooperative manner through the open disclosure of new
knowledge and peer testing of that knowledge. 43 The incentive
provided to members of the Republic of Science relates to the de-
velopment of "collegiate reputations and ... material and non-
pecuniary rewards... ." In addition, the temptation to free-ride
on the works of others exists within the Republic of Science, just as
it does in the Regime of Technology; however, the system of norms
in the Republic of Science has withstood the free-rider problem
and has conveyed "some positive, functional value" to a substantial
336. Id. at 5.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 9.
339. Id. at 5.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 3. For a further discussion of the norms of science, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Proprietay Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987).
342. David, supra note 18, at 3.
343. Id.
344. Id. The benefits can include "reputational standing and the esteem of colleagues,
enhanced access to research resources, formal organizational recognition through promo-
tions accompanied by higher salary, accession to positions of authority and influence within
professional bodies and public institutions, [and] the award of prizes and honors." Id. at 4.
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number of scientists working in the Regime and, consequently, has
benefited the public through the creation and distribution of
knowledge. 45 David also extols the benefits of an incentive system
based on good reputation and openness because this system en-
courages the "rapid validation of findings, and reduces excess
duplication of research efforts."3 46 A proprietary rights system that
encourages secrecy and a race to priority will potentially have a
problem with validating findings and managing duplicative re-searh P 341
search efforts. Meanwhile, the wide sharing of information helps
to place information in the possession of the people who can best
use it, even if these people are not the original discoverer or inven-
tor.3 48 Moreover, because the incentive structure largely consists of
peer-provided benefits, researchers will choose to investigate prob-
lems that others have reviewed, thereby achieving appreciation
among peers.3 4 This results in a bias toward "'research spillovers,'
rather than 'product-design spillovers' in the sphere of commercial
innovation."
3 5 0
David asserts that the structure and purposes of the Republic of
Science are better suited to develop reliable knowledge, and the
Republic of Science must remain distinct from the Regime of
Technology. 5' David explores the ways that "public expenditures
for the support of open science serve to enhance the value of
commercially-oriented R&D as a socially productive and privately
profitable form of investment."
3 2
David discusses the Tragedy of the Anticommons in the context
of the Walsh Study's attempt to gather empirical evidence to de-
termine whether a serious Tragedy of the Anticommons had
emerged. The "thrust of their 'findings' was that while there were
345. Id. at 3.





351. Id. at 5.
352. Id. David points to the spillovers of applied technology which have originated from
basic research such as, "airline reservation systems, packet switching for high-speed tele-
phone traffic, the Internet communication protocols, the Global Positioning System, and
computer simulation methods for the visualization of molecular structures." Id. at 5-6. David
also points to the benefit of having an expansive knowledge base developed from basic re-
search. Id. A knowledge base that often informs the applied researcher whether a specific
research agenda is plausible or not, which results in certainty in investment. Id. at 7. David
also states that universities engaged in basic research provide an excellent training ground
for young researchers that are often employed by private firms. Id.
353. Id. at 13.
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a few isolated instances of serious difficulties in working out the
IPR arrangements among firms, and between firms and universi-
ties, their interviews disclosed nothing resembling a 'tragedy.' ,354
David criticizes the study for failing to describe the interview pro-
tocol followed in the survey.3 55 David notes that the form of the
questions may compel an interviewee to state that there is no prob-
lem when in fact there is one.356 For example, survey respondents
may have stated that rights holders do not enforce their rights11 351
against potential infringing firms and, thus, there is no problem.
David argues that this conclusion is misleading because there
merely has not been a cause.3 18 "The proper conclusion is: We can't
say what the effect of the IPR regime will be in this instance, except
that when a cease and desist injunction is brought against one of
these professors, and her university is charged with patent in-
fringement and sued for damages .... it is going to be a big
shock. 359
David states that interpreting the evidence can be problematic
where the interpretation depends on whether the researcher ap-
proaches the Tragedy of the Anticommons in an economically
naive or sophisticated manner.3 60 A naive approach would be to be-
lieve that
[P] arties to a potentially productive coalition will see only the
value of cooperating for a common benefit, and will ignore
the possible costs of contracting. So, if IPR has the effect of
raising the parties [sic] valuation of their own contribution to
the collective project, and makes it possible for them to deny
others access to that contribution, the negotiation of coopera-
tive agreements will be surprisingly difficult, and frequently
these will fail. One should be able to find records, or elicit tes-
timony of such failures. Look for them in order to test the
'anti-commons' hypothesis.36'
According to David, a sophisticated analysis begins with Coase's
theorem that "institutional arrangements that assigned property
rights to some agents would only affect the efficiency of resource







361. Id. at 14-15.
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allocation among them if there were zero 'costs of transacting,' of
arriving at a contract in which the gains from trade would be se-
cured for the collectivity and distributed among them. 3 62 David
asserts that parties will consider ex ante the benefit of entering into
any such contract, including the right to any rent streams and the
costs of negotiating that contract.3 63 A party conducting this analysis
will take into consideration any institutional change that may alter
the property rights of the parties and the consequent "affect of this
on the nature of the contracting process and its costs." 364 If an insti-
tutional change occurs, it may modify each party's expectations of
the benefits received from the transaction.3 65 This, in turn, might
raise the costs of the transaction to a point that renders some
transactions foolish to complete, especially those projects that
would result in a lower expected rate of return and those that are
of a higher commercial or scientific risk. 66 Consequently, rational
agents will avoid serious consideration of certain financially risky
projects. 3 67 According to David, a rational agent would not report
any higher frequency of blocked or abandoned projects after the
institutional change than it would before such change. Thus, in
order to determine the effect of the institutional change, one must
determine what might occur in a counterfactual world: "what pro-
jects that were not seriously considered, would have been
considered. 3 69 Project consideration would likely shift then to
those projects in which
The distribution of initial property rights among the partici-
pating [parties] was already highly asymmetric[,1 and the
relative disparity in bargaining power would not be materially
changed by the altered property rights regime, so the esti-
mated transaction costs wouldn't be significantly affected; ...
[t]he private expected rate of return was higher than the
norm for the previously undertaken projects, and so could jus-







368. Id. This assumes that the rational agent is in possession of the information to make
the decision that a particular transaction will or will not fail. For example, the perceived
value of a particular research tool by the owner of the IP rights in the research tool is not
known until the negotiations begin.
369. Id.
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together [and] ... [t]he risk-return ratios for the projects un-
dertaken are found to have been lower than those among the
projects previously undertaken.7 0
Thus:
[the] institutional change that raises the marginal costs of
transactions of a particular kind need not actually increase
the amount of resources consumed by such transactions;
rather[,] it may push resources into other channels, and leave
a gap between the marginal rates of return that the realized
projects in that area yield (gross of negotiation expenses) and
the rates of return on the other kinds of projects. That gap is
a measure of the social burden of 'royalty stacking,' 'blocking
patents,' etc.3
71
The gap of lost opportunities likely cannot be measured exactly
because a different group of projects will be present after the insti-
tutional shift.
372
David concludes that a search for evidence of a Tragedy of the
Anticommons is difficult because the researcher is searching for
counterfactual evidence. 73 She attempts to prove that if something
had not happened, then something else would have happened that
would have caused the world to be different than it is today.
374
David questions why the burden of proof to demonstrate the anti-
commons must be on the critics questioning the effect of the
institutional shift.375 David notes that the assumption that "competi-
tive markets and well-defined private property rights can support a
socially optimal equilibrium in the allocation of resources, ...
ceases to hold [true] in the realm of information and knowl-
edge. 37 6 David would require those in favor of a stronger
intellectual property rights regime to demonstrate that
the moves already made in that direction have not been eco-
nomically damaging; that further encroachments into the public
domain of scientific data and information would not be still more
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. David suggest that, in principle, one could "examine the characteristics of the
entire portfolio of research projects that were being undertaken before and after the institu-
tional innovation." Id.
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harmful; [and] that society would not benefit by adopting a policy
that was just the opposite of the one they support.
D. A Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology
and Agriculture: The Golden Rice Problem
While not in the biomedical arena, a recent anticommons prob-
lem has arisen in the biotechnology and agriculture field. This
anticommons example helps clarify the interaction between tech-
nology development, the patent thicket, and attempts to create
products that are socially beneficial. Researchers at the Swiss Fed-
eral Institute of Technology transplanted certain genes from the
daffodil plant into rice, creating a type of rice that is capable of
producing a precursor chemical to vitamin A.378 This so-called
"golden rice" has the potential to alleviate life-threatening vitamin
A deficiency in disadvantaged children throughout the world.379
However, to create the rice, researchers had to use university-
patented technology that had since been licensed to private agri-
cultural biotechnology companies.380 More than forty patents and
contractual obligations associated with material transfer agree-
ments presented obstacles to producing golden rice.3 ' The private
companies initially were unreceptive to providing licenses to the
researchers and almost caused researchers to abandon the pro-
ject. 8  However, because of the public debate in Europe
concerning genetically modified crops, several private companies
seized the "golden rice" opportunity to demonstrate that geneti-
cally modified crops can help the poor.83 Consequently, the private
companies transferred the necessary rights to the researchers so
3814that they could develop and produce the crops.
377. Id.
378. Justin Gillis, Researchers to Keep Some Biotech Rights, WASH. PosT, July 11, 2003, at E5.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Richard C. Atkinson et al., Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management,
301 SCIENCE 174, 174 (July 11, 2003).
382. Gillis, supra note 378.
383. Id.
384. Id.
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E. Analysis of Research
The NIH Study and the Walsh Study apparently reach conflict-
ing results. The NIH Study finds "a rising frustration among
scientists concerning delays in obtaining licenses for IP rights" and
that "[v] irtually every [private] firm believe [s] that restricted access
to research tools is impeding the rapid advance of research and
that the problem is getting worse." 85 Moreover, the NIH Study re-
veals that technology transfer professionals have told scientists to
forgo the use of some research tools when a university has been
unable to agree with other parties on the terms of licenses for ac-
cess to research tools. 3 6 In contrast, the Walsh Study asserts that
"the vast majority of respondents say that there are no cases in
which valuable research projects were stopped because of IP prob-
lems related to research inputs." 7 The Walsh Study also indicates
that the anticommons has not emerged as particularly problem-
388atic.
The two studies can be viewed as consistent. While the Walsh
Study recognizes that certain conditions conducive to creating an
anticommons exist, these conditions have not substantially im-
peded drug discovery.389 The NIH Study might merely provide
support for the conclusion that certain conditions exist that may
allow an anticommons to develop. 90 Moreover, the Walsh Study
occurred several years after the NIH Study. Perhaps the lessons
learned from the NIH Study, combined with several additional
years of experience in between the two studies, allowed industry
participants to reduce the transaction costs involved in licensing
patented research tools.
391Professor David criticizes the Walsh Study for several reasons.
First, David wonders whether the questions drove the conclusions in
the Walsh Study, particularly since the report does not provide the
form of the questions.39 ' The same criticism can be directed at the
NIH Study. David further criticizes the Walsh Study for failing
to accurately measure the impact of the Tragedy of the
385. NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
386. Id.
387. WALSCH ET AL., supra note 14, at 286.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 295-97.
390. See generally NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
391. David, supra note 18, at 13-15.
392. Id. at 13-14.
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Anticommons9  David argues that rational actors will ignore
certain projects-those yielding a low expected rate of return or
carrying high scientific or commercial risk-that might otherwise
be considered absent blocking patents and royalty stacking. 94
David points out that it is difficult to measure exactly how many
projects a rational actor did not pursue simply because he would
never consider such project in the first place. Accordingly, David
argues that a search for evidence of a Tragedy of the Anticommons
is difficult because the researcher must prove a counterfactual: that
if something had not happened, then something else would have
resulted. 395 The Walsh Study provides some support for this
argument by noting that royalty stacking did not present a
significant impediment to ongoing R&D projects, because in the
few cases in which a problem did occur, the problem was
anticipated.396 Moreover, as described infra, the golden rice
problem, albeit in agricultural biotechnology, provides an example
of how easily an anticommons can develop for a commercial
application that rational actors may not consider commercially
viable yet may provide significant social benefits. As David argues,
that particular type of breakdown may not be reported because a
rational actor may never seriously consider development of that
commercial application.397
An additional problem is that neither study provides the specific
number of interviewees that responded in a particular way to a par-
ticular question. Thus, the amount of support provided for each
conclusion in both studies is unclear.
Because of ambiguous findings concerning the existence of a
Tragedy of the Anticommons, this Article suggests that additional
studies be conducted to consider this potential problem. The
Walsh Study, which suggests that an anticommons problem may
develop and that ongoing scrutiny is warranted, supports this con-
clusion. Further study is especially important in light of recent
Federal Circuit cases that clarify the limited scope of the experi-
mental use exception to patent infringement.9 Additionally, in a
393. Id. at 14-15.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 16.
396. WALSCH ET AL., supra note 14, at 300. The authors note that, "[o]ur interviews sug-
gest that the main reasons why projects were not undertaken reflected considerations of
technological opportunity, demand, and internal resource constraints, with expected licens-
ing fees or 'tangles' or rights on tools playing a subordinate rule, salient for only those
projects which were commercially less viable." Id. at 304.
397. David, supranote 18, at 14-15.
398. WALSCH ET AL., supra note 14, at 331, 335-36.
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recent report entitled "Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property
Rights and Licensing Practices," the OECD recommended the con-
tinued monitoring of patenting and licensing of genetic
inventions.3 99 The OECD also recommended the collection and
analysis of robust economic data to ensure that access does not be-
come problematic. °°
IX. POTENTIAL PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
This section describes and analyzes proposed solutions to the
Tragedy of the Anticommons. Commentators have proposed
changes in the utility requirement for patentability, a fair use ex-
ception to patent law, expansion of the experimental use
exception, and the use of patent pools or collective rights organiza-
tions to overcome a Tragedy of the Anticommons.
A. Heightened Utility Requirement
1. Utility-Along with patent eligible subject matter, non-
obviousness, and novelty, utility is a statutory prerequisite for an
invention to be patentable. 4 1 At least one author has suggested that
the utility requirement for patentability be used to curtail the
number of patents issued on biotechnology inventions and re-
search tools. 40 2 The Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and the
USPTO have gone back and forth on restricting and expanding
the use of the utility requirement as a device to allow or disallow
399. OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 78.
400. Id.
401. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
tile.").
402. Summers, supra note 22. But seeJulian David Forman, Comment, A Timing Perspec-
tive on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnology Patent Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. Sem. & TECH. 647
(2002) (arguing that more restrictive PTO guidelines will hamper the progress of biotech-
nology invention by delaying patent protection until later stages of invention resulting in
less investment in high-risk research and development).
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patents on chemical or biotechnological inventions. 3 Most re-
cently, the USPTO issued examination guidelines that set forth an
arguably more restrictive view of utility than courts have previously
required.4 °4
The utility requirement ensures that the public receives an in-
vention that is useful in exchange for the limited right to exclude
others from practicing the invention. An invention is useful if it
"perform[s] some function of positive benefit to society," or
achieves some practical utility.40 6 Courts divide the utility require-
ment into three parts when analyzing whether an invention possess
the requisite statutory utility: general utility, specific utility, and
moral utility.40 7 "An invention that possesses general utility is one
that is operable, or capable of doing something. '"40  "A finding of
specific utility requires that the invention provide a solution to a
stated problem."40 9 "Courts may then question whether an inven-
tion is beneficial to society or if there is an absence of immoral
purposes." 10 In the past, courts have laxly enforced the utility re-
quirement, demanding that inventors meet only a very low
threshold for patentability.
4 1
The utility requirement is easily met for some types of inven-
tions, i.e., mechanical or electrical inventions; however, the utility
requirement is often a "problem with chemical compounds and
403. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1995); USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (2001) [hereinafter 2001
Utility Examination Guidelines].
404. 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 403.
405. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534 ("The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constim-
tion and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public
from an invention with substantial utility.").
406. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 4-2 (2003). See also INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY, supra note 8, at 315 ("Utility ordinarily presents a minimal requirement that the
invention be capable of achieving a pragmatic result."); MUELLER, supra note 58, at 156
("United States patent law requires that patentable inventions possess 'practical utility.' In
other words, to be patentable an invention must have some real world use.").
407. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 163 (2000); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial DNA Sequences, 23
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5-6 (1995); Forman, supra note 402, at 650 ("The utility inquiry can be di-
vided conceptually into three parts: general utility, specific utility, and moral (or beneficial)
utility.").
408. Forman, supra note 402, at 650, n.16; see MARTINJ. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 141 (2003) ("Courts, as well as the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, have also employed the utility requirement to reject wholly inoperable inventions.").
409. Forman, supra note 402, at 650, n.16.
410. Id.
411. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 1007 n.78 (1997).
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processes-particularly pharmaceutical compounds[,]" and bio-
technology.412 "In these fields, inventors sometimes synthesize
compounds without a precise knowledge of how they may be used
to achieve a practical working result."41 3 Thus, a particular isolated
and purified DNA sequence may have multiple potential down-
stream uses that are unknown to the researcher.414 The only cited
utility of an isolated and purified DNA sequence may be its use as
an object of further research. 5
In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court examined the utility
requirement as applied to chemical processes. 6 The examiner de-
nied Manson's application, and the Board of Appeals later
affirmed, on the ground that there was a failure to disclose any util-
ity for the chemical compound that the process had produced. 7
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)418 reversed the
Board of Appeals, stating, "'where a claimed process produces a
known product it is not necessary to show utility for the product,'
so long as the product 'is not alleged to be detrimental to the pub-
lic interest.' ,4'9 The Supreme Court reversed the CCPA.420 The
Court rejected Manson's arguments that the applicant had demon-
strated utility by showing one of the following: (1) that the claimed
process produced a product under investigation by serious scien-
tific researchers, (2) that the process produces the intended
product, or (3) that an adjacent homologue4 2 1 of the steroid that
the applicant's process produces has tumor-inhibiting effects in
mice. 2 The Court held that "[u] nless and until a process is refined
and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists in cur-
rently available form-there is insufficient justification for
permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad
412. CHISUM, supra note 406, at 4-2; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Supra note 8, at 315.
413. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 315.
414. Summers, supra note 22, at 478-479.
415. Id. at 479.
416. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
417. Id. at 521.
418. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was the predecessor court of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
419. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 522. (quoting In reManson, 333 E2d 234, 237-238 (1964)).
420. Id.
421. "'A homologous series is a family of chemically related compounds, the composi-
tion of which varies from member to member by CH[2] (one atom of carbon and two atoms
of hydrogen) .... Chemists knowing the properties of one member of a series would in
general know what to expect in adjacent members.'" Id. at 522 n.3 (quoting Application of
Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 200-201 (1950)). The Court noted that there is a "'greater known
unpredictability of compounds"' in the field of steroids. Id. at 532.
422. Id. at 531-533.
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field."423 The Court expressed concern that if a patent were allowed
to issue on a claimed process, yielding a product with unknown
utility, then the patent might encompass unknown areas of scien-
tific development without providing the benefit to society-the
substantial utility-that is at the heart of the quid pro quo that
Congress had contemplated.4 4 The Court stated, "a patent is not a
hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation




The Supreme Court in Brenner clearly set forth a restrictive view
of the utility doctrine, at least as applied to chemical processes. A
patentee, under Brenner, can obtain a patent only after demonstrat-
ing a specific benefit from the patentee's claimed invention. The
Federal Circuit in In re Brana examined the utility requirement in
the context of pharmaceuticals and established a more lenient ap-
proach.4 6 The court reversed a decision of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, affirming an examiner's rejection of a
patentee's claims because the claimed compounds lacked utility as
antitumor substances. 27 The court framed the issue on appeal by
asking "with regard to pharmaceutical inventions, what must the
applicant prove regarding the practical utility or usefulness of the
invention for which patent protection is sought[?]"12 ' The court
stated that applicants must provide sufficient evidence to convince
a person skilled in the particular art that the invention possesses
the asserted utility.429 In this case, the evidence included a declara-
tion with test results showing that several compounds within the
scope of the claims exhibited significant antitumor activity against
423. Id. at 534-535.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 536.
426. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1560-61.
427. Id. at 1565. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, in In reBrana, based its
affirmance of the examiner's rejection on a lack of utility which violated 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1 1, not 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 1564. Section 112, paragraph 1, of 35 U.S.C. states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor
of carrying out his invention.
Id. at 1564. The Federal Circuit thus reviewed the Board's affirmance based on section
112. Id.
428. Id. at 1564.
429. Id. at 1566-1567. The Court initially held that the PTO failed to carry its initial
burden of challenging the presumptively correct assertion of utility. Id. at 1566. The Court
considered the applicant's rebuttal evidence as an alternative basis for its holding that the
claimed invention satisfied any utility requirement. Id. at 1567.
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the standard tumor model in vivo. 43 ° Moreover, the court rejected
the Commissioner's argument that in vivo tests in animals are in-
sufficient to demonstrate utility because such tests are not
reasonably predictive of the success of the compounds in treating
cancer in humans.13 ' The court stated that "[u]sefulness in patent
law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions,
necessarily includes the expectation of further research and devel-
opment ... [and t]he stage at which an invention in this field
becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to hu-
mans."432 The court noted that "[w]ere we to require [Food and
Drug Administration] Phase II (significant testing on humans) in
order to prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many
companies from obtaining patent protection on promising new
inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, through
research and development, potential cures [to diseases] .,4
In 1995, the same year in which the Federal Circuit issued In re
Brana, the USPTO released the 1995 Examination Guidelines.434
The Guidelines and In re Brana apparently represented an inter-
pretation of the utility requirement that was much more lenient
than that which the Brenner court had contemplated. Subsequently,
a flood of patent applications covering so-called "ESTs" were sub-
mitted to the USPTO. ESTs are fragments of genes, usually with
unknown biological function. In response to industry, academic,
and government outcry concerning the patenting of ESTs, the
USPTO released the 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines.3 ' The
2001 Utility Examination Guidelines require a well-established util-
ity in the art, i.e., a utility that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would immediately appreciate or a demonstration of a specific,
credible, and substantial utility."36 The requirement that an inven-
tion have a specific, credible, and substantial utility excludes
"nonspecific," "throw-away," or "insubstantial" utilities, "such as the
use of a complex invention as landfill."43 7 At least one author ar-
gues that the new guidelines will prevent the patenting of genes.
430. Id. at 1568.
431. Id. at 1568-1569.
432. Id. at 1569.
433. Id.
434. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (july 14, 1995).
435. 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 403.
436. Id.
437. Idat 1098.
438. Smith, supra note 42, at 749-50 (arguing that new guidelines will prevent the pat-
enting of genes and deter investment in biotechnology companies).
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2. Proposed Heightened Utility Requirement and Analysis-One au-
thor advocates adoption of a utility requirement that is more
stringent than that set forth in the 2001 Utility Examination Guide-
lines. 439 The author states that broad patents in basic biotechnology
research are improper because the development of today's patent
law fails to account for two trends in modern biotechnology."0 The
first trend is that biotechnology research is unveiling science at an
increasingly rudimentary level while patent law is becoming
broader, thus threatening to remove fundamental building blocks
of science from the public domain. 44' The second trend involves
the Bayh-Dole Act, which provides an incentive for discoverers-
particularly public discoverers--of rudimentary upstream research
tools to patent those tools and license them to downstream com-
mercial innovators."2  The author reviews philosophical and
economic rationales for patent law and concludes that those ra-
tionales support an even narrower utility requirement in light of
the cited trends.4" 3 The proposed narrower utility requirement, for
example, would require an applicant for a gene patent to disclose
the encoded protein along with the function of that protein."4
Early patenting in the biotechnology innovation process is im-
portant to the continued growth and development of the industry.
Biotechnology research and development is risky, complex, and
uncertain, and heavily reliant upon venture capital funding."5 A
biotechnology start-up often has no revenue to fund research and
development except through outside sources."6 Patents provide
biotechnology firms assets, often their only assets, with which to
439. Summers, supra note 22, at 477-78.
440. Id. at 476.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 477. The author asserts that the incentive to invent theory fails to justify a
broad utility requirement because the traditional public sector is motivated by increasing
the storehouse of public knowledge, not by potential patent rights, and the patentee of a
patent directed to a DNA sequence which does not disclose the function of the protein it
encodes will free ride on the efforts of subsequent researchers that discover that function.
Id. at 487. The author also asserts that the incentive to disclose theory does not justify a
broad utility requirement because a patent directed to a DNA sequence fails to disclose the
uses of a research tool, and the information often disclosed is already known or will be pub-
licly disclosed. Id. at 488. Finally, the author asserts that the incentive to innovate theory fails
to justify a broad utility requirement because the "commercial value in biotechnology lies
not in isolating a gene sequence, but further downstream once the gene's function has been
determined." Id. at 491.
444. Id. at 480-81.
445. See supra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
446. Id.
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secure venture capital funding. 7 Without a patent, venture capital-
ists may be unwilling to invest in biotechnology research and
development.4" Furthermore, the FDA requires a bevy of clinical
trials to test a compound, amounting to a significant investment of
time and effort on the part of researchers. " Consequently, re-
searchers in the pharmaceutical field have an interest in patenting
pharmaceutical compounds early in the development process,
even when the specific properties of that compound are not fully
understood; a broader utility requirement may frustrate that inter-
est. 450 Patents also are a valuable commodity to trade to potential
partners who have the expertise to further develop a product or
who are able to get a product past any regulatory hurdles and re-
lease it to the market.45 Accordingly, patents provide an incentive
for venture capitalists to invest in the continued development and
commercialization of biotechnology commercial applications. 2
Heightening the utility requirement may make sense for ESTs
with a minimal disclosed utility given the use of techniques such as
high-throughput sequencing. However, the utility requirement
should not prevent the patenting of research tools whose only
purpose relates to the development or research of commercial ap-
plications. Some biotechnology companies only create research
tools, and a market for those tools has developed.453 Moreover, if
research tools are not patentable, developers of those tools may
use them in secret rather than disclosing them publicly.454 Without
public disclosure of the tools, competing firms may waste signifi-
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 318:
The utility requirement should be viewed in light of the considerable incentives
chemists and biochemists possess to obtain patent protection on compounds of in-
terest as soon as possible .... [I]n the case of pharmaceutical compounds, food and
drug authorities require considerable product testing before the pharmaceutical can
be broadly marketed. Before investing further time and effort on laboratory testing
and clinical trials, actors in the pharmaceutical filed desire to obtain patent rights on
promising compounds even where their particular properties are, as yet, not well un-
derstood. But when patent applications are filed too close to the laboratory bench,
chemists and biotechnicians have discovered that the ordinarily dormant utility re-
quirement has posed considerable obstacles.
Id.
450. Id.
451. See supra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
452. Id.
453. NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
454. Forman, supra note 402, at 661.
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cant resources duplicating research in order to develop a previ-
ously invented tool.
4 5
Because of the ambiguous evidence of a Tragedy of the Anti-
commons, the utility requirement should not be heightened. A
more stringent utility requirement may disrupt the valuable incen-
tives that patents provide to invent, disclose, and innovate.
B. A Fair Use Exception to Patent Infringement
Professor Maureen O'Rourke argues that, because of several re-
cent developments, current patent law doctrine fails to strike the
proper balance between the grant of exclusive rights to encourage
innovation and the maintenance of a vibrant public domain.456
These developments include: fast-paced high technology, an ex-
panded definition of patent eligible subject matter, the PTO
issuing patents at a record rate, the impact of the Federal Circuit
holding patents valid more often than prior courts, and an in-
creased likelihood of situations in which the grant of a patent
would be socially beneficial but a breakdown in bargaining is likely
to result. 157 O'Rourke advocates the adoption of a fair use excep-
tion in patent law-similar to that in copyright law-to address any
anticommons effects when the costs for any one entity to accumu-
late all the required licenses to develop a socially beneficial
product or service is prohibitive .
O'Rourke recognizes that though patent law does not have a
broad scope limiting doctrine similar to that found in copyright
law, patent law has other scope limiting doctrines.4 5 9 Those doc-
trines include: the ability to reevaluate a patent's validity, the ability
to construe claims, the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the doc-
trine of blocking patents, the experimental use exception, and
455. Id. (arguing that the issuance of patents will deter rent seeking because the issu-
ance of a patent itself communicates to firms that a particular problem has been solved and
competitors should stop expending R&D dollars to solve that particular problem).
456. O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 1178-79.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1177-79. The fair use exception to copyright infringement generally provides
a privilege for one to use a copyrighted work in a reasonable manner without the owners
consent. Id. at 1188. Effectively, the fair use exception "imposes a limited royalty-free com-
pulsory license on the copyright owner: The party asserting the defense has infringed, but
that infringement is excused." Id.
459. O'Rourke specifically references Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
wherein the Supreme Court held that the fair use doctrine applied to excuse allegedly in-
fringing copying of copyrighted broadcasts. Id. at 1188-1189 (citing 464 U.S 417 (1984)).
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patent misuse.46° O'Rourke notes that patent law may not have a
broad fair use doctrine because, in contrast to the almost negligi-
ble costs of obtaining copyright protection, obtaining a patent can
be very costly.46' O'Rourke argues that even a combination of the
above doctrines fails to match the prowess of the copyright fair use
defense, which rectifies market failures that would render "exclu-
sive rights overbroad and prevent socially efficient and desirable
uses of the copyrighted work from occurring." 462 Market failures
occurring in copyright law fall within three categories: "(i) high
transaction costs that frustrate private bargaining[, including iden-
tifying, contacting, and contracting with multiple rights holders];
(ii) positive externalities that prevent the infringer from being able
to pay the copyright owner's price for the license; and (iii) the fail-
ure of any market for the particular use to develop.
463
According to O'Rourke, market failures are occurring more of-
ten in markets for patentable products.4  O'Rourke relies upon
domestic scholars and international movements to point to specific
market failures that current patent doctrine does not remedy but
that a fair use exception would remedy.465 The market failures in-
clude: the liability of a researcher who infringes a patent in the
course of verifying the functionality of the patented invention; sub-
jecting a researcher who develops an improvement or alternative
to a patented invention to liability, including an injunction; liability
for infringing conduct such as teaching or research, wherein the
infringer advances research without harming the patentee; and
liability for a researcher who uses a patented invention to develop
a non-infringing product.
46
O'Rourke identifies five factors relevant to determining whether
a fair use exception should apply to patent infringement: (1) the
nature of the advance that the infringement represents, 467 (2) the
460. Id. at 1188-89.
461. Id. at 1185-1186.
462. Id. at 1187.
463. Id. at 1188.
464. Id. at 1187.
465. Id. at 1198-1202. O'Rourke also relies upon provisions of the Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement as providing "a strong international norm in
favor of allowing socially beneficial infringements to occur" tojustify adoption of a fair use
exemption. Id. at 1202.
466. Id. at 1200.
467. Id. at 1205. This factor focuses on whether the infringing work is a major or minor
advance in the art. Id at 1206. If the work is a major advance, then the public welfare is likely
substantially improved and thus, the work is more likely a fair use. Id.
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purpose of the infringing use,468 (3) the nature and strength of the
market failure that prevents a license from being concluded,469
(4) the impact of the use on the patentee's incentives and overall
social welfare, 470 and (5) the nature of the patented work.4 71 Similar
to the fair use analysis in copyright law, the court should balance
the fair use factors to determine whether the fair use exception
should apply to patent infringement.472  Finally, if the court
determines that the use is fair, then the court must determine
whether the infringer should compensate the patentee with a
royalty.
4 73
O'Rourke applies the fair use factors to specific industries, in-
cluding the software industry474 and the biotechnology industry.4 7
Specifically, O'Rourke reviews Heller and Eisenberg's Tragedy of
the Anticommons theory and concludes that the doctrine of fair
use can be used to excuse some infringement and alleviate anti-
commons concerns. 6 O'Rourke suggests that fair use "could be
used to excuse infringement by researchers attempting to invent
around the patent even when the eventual end product is to be
marketed commercially. ''477 She also states that fair use could be
468. Id at 1205. This factor determines whether the use is non-commercial, indirectly
commercial or commercial. Id. at 1206. A finding of commercial use increases the likelihood
that fair use does not exist. Id
469. Id. at 1205. This factor examines the specific market defect and how it impacts the
market. Id. at 1206-07.
470. Id. at 1205. This factor focuses on whether widespread infringing use would ad-
versely impact the market for the patented invention. Id at 1207. Particularly, this factor
examines the "social benefit to be gained by allowing the infringement balanced against the
cost to the patentee, including the impact on incentives to invent." Id. "Harm to the pat-
entee is likely to be greater when the infringement leads to a competitive product and it will
be greatest when that product is also directly infringing." Id at 1207-08. Moreover, "[tihe
courts should focus on the nature of both R&D and product-market competition in the
particular industry." Idat 1208.
471. Id. at 1205. This factor examines whether the work is a pioneering work or a
smaller advance over the prior work. Id. at 1208. If the work is pioneering, then the fair use
right should be narrow. Id.
472. Id. at 1209. "The most important factors are the third and fourth which emphasize
the reality of market conditions and the impact on the intellectual property balance. As in
copyright law, no one factor would be determinative and fair use would be an equitable and
affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the infringer." Id.
473. Id.
474. Id at 1211. O'Rourke argues that the fair use defense is needed to excuse reverse
engineering to produce software compatible with the dominant operating system. Id. at
1212. She asserts that a fair use approach would allow the court with doctrinal latitude to
consider policy concerns without contorting "existing patent doctrine to achieve a desirable
result." Id. at 1230.
475. Id. at 1236-39.
476. Id. at 1237-38.
477. Idat 1238.
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used in situations wherein a developer of a product has gathered
almost all of the necessary licenses to bring a product to market,
but because of a hold-out, is unable to license the final piece of
technology needed.47 s The fair use doctrine might allow the devel-
oper of a product to move forward without the license from the
holdout.4 7 9 Finally, O'Rourke states that the mere presence of a fair
use doctrine "may make patentees more willing to form institutions
to decrease transaction costs.""48
O'Rourke's suggested proposal for a fair use exception fills in
the gaps between several patent law doctrines, including the ex-
perimental use exception and the reverse doctrine of equivalence,
and attempts to preserve the incentive to invent that the patent
grant provides. However, a broad, uncertain exception might
erode the incentives that patents provide to invent, innovate, and
disclose inventions. This outcome is particularly likely in the bio-
technology industry, where research and development is uncertain
and complex.4 8 ' As discussed above, the biotechnology industry is
capital intensive and relies upon the influx of funding from ven-
ture capitalists to continue innovating."s2 Strong and stable patent
rights provide the necessary incentive for venture capitalists to in-
4813vest in biotechnology companies. A broad exception, the scope
of which is determined only after litigation, may undermine the
incentive to invest that stable and certain patents provide.
Moreover, a broad exception to copyright infringement may be
justified because of the low threshold for obtaining, and the ease
of securing, copyright protection for a work of authorship. Patent
protection is only granted after a relatively extensive USPTO re-
view. Furthermore, patents are subject to USPTO reexamination
and court invalidation. The expense and time involved in obtain-
ing a patent for a non-pioneering, yet patentable, invention may
not be justified if a broad fair use defense is available. Notably, it is
in precisely this type of case that the fair use defense may apply.
48 4
In these situations, an inventor may decide to keep an invention
secret instead of attempting to obtain patent protection.4 In addi-




481. See infra Introduction.
482. See infra Part IV.
483. See infra Part IV.
484. O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 1208.
485. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
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in copyrighted works may be overstated as the market still needs
collective rights organizations such as BMI and ASCAP to address
numerous failures.486
Professor O'Rourke provides the example of using the fair use
doctrine to prevent a potential licensor from refusing to license to
a product developer that has amassed almost all of the necessary
licenses to bring a product to market.48 ' At least one problem with
the application of the fair use doctrine in this case is that the licen-
sor may be refusing to license simply because the license fees are
not acceptable. If the court applies the fair use doctrine, it must
determine whether the requested license fees are reasonable.8 8
The court is put in the position of valuing a piece of intellectual
property and determining the appropriate amount of a license
fee.89 Though a court can determine a license fee, a collective
rights organization or a patent pool is arguably better equipped to
determine the value of a piece of intellectual property.490
As reviewed above, the evidence of a Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons is, at best, unclear. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to weaken
patent rights, a move that may undermine the incentives that pat-
ents provide to invent, disclose, and innovate.
C. The Experimental Use Exception
In a series of decisions, courts developed a common law excep-
tion to patent infringement relating to experimental use.491 The
exception recognized that "an experiment with a patented article
for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity,
or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee. ,48 2 Accordingly, if the researcher had a commercial intent
or, in other words, an intent to profit, then the researcher's use of
486. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collec-
tive Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1328 (1996).
487. O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 1239.
488. Merges, supra note 486, at 1317 ("Unless a special 'rate court' were established to
administer these [licensing] disputes, each judge in each case would have to be educated
about the industry, about appropriate [intellectual property rights] valuation ranges, and
the like. These costs would clearly be large ...
489. Id.
490. Id. Professor O'Rourke argues that in the biotechnology industry some players may
be repeat players, but there is rapid market turnover which imposes negative externalities
on the public. O'Rourke, supra note 24, at 1245.
491. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
492. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
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the patented invention would not be exempted from infringe-
ment.49 3 Justice Story stated the rationale for the exception: "[i]t
could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of
the machine to produce its described effects." 94 In recognition of
the need to bring generic pharmaceuticals to market quickly, Con-
gress enacted a statutory experimental use exception. 9 5  The
exception is limited to pharmaceuticals and medical devices and use
of the patented invention while preparing for clinical trials. 96 Uni-
versity scientists using patented research tools to further their
research often rely upon these common law and statutory excep-
tions. However, because of the very narrow scope of the exception,
it is not clear that all the actions of those claiming the exception
should be exempted from infringement. In recent years, because of
the expansion of patentable inventions to research tools and the
merger of public and private research, commentators have called
upon Congress and the courts to broaden the experimental use
493. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813):
"[T]he making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of phi-
losophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification
(citation omitted). In other words, that the making must be with an intent to infringe
the patent-right, and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery.
Id. See also Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D. Colo. 1935); Chesterfield
v. United States, 159 E Supp. 371, 375-376 (C1. Ct. 1958).
494. Whittemore, 29 F Cas. at 1121.
495. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1) (1994). This section was enacted in response to Roche Prod-
ucts v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which held that Bolar's use of
Roche's patented active ingredients of Dalmane for equivalency testing to satisfy federal
requirements before marketing of the generic drug was not exempted from infringement.
Id. at 867.
496. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994).
497. See Biotech Strategies, supra note 147 ("[A National Academies of Sciences] survey
showed that almost 80% of scientists at academic institutions and companies believed their
research activities were immune under the [research use] exemption.");John W. Schlicher,
Biotechnology and the Patent System; Patent Law and Procedures for Biotechnology, Health Care and
Other Industries, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 121,139 (1996):
While the words in the cases seemed somewhat narrower, most patent owners either
understood (or operated under the implicit assumption) that others could conduct
research using their inventions, when that research was designed to make other in-
ventions, whether complementary or substitute, or to do research simply for the sake
of doing research, historically the function of our universities.
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exception. 9 However, in a recent Federal Circuit decision, the
court interpreted the common law exception extremely 
narrowly.499
Moreover, the Federal Circuit limited the reach of the already nar-
row statutory exception °°
1. Madey v. Duke University-In Madey v. Duke University, the
Federal Circuit made clear that the common law experimental use
defense did not apply to the use of patented inventions in univer-
sity research that has even a remote commercial purpose,
including merely furthering the university's legitimate business ob-
jectives.5 1 The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Duke, and held that the experimen-
tal use exception did not apply to Duke's use of Plaintiff Madey's
patented laser technology.5 2  Plaintiff Madey, a successful re-
searcher in the laser research field, had joined Duke as a lab
director and had moved his laser research laboratory there.
Madey owned two patents used in some of the equipment in the
laboratory.5 0 4 Duke eventually removed Madey as lab director, and
Madey subsequently resigned from Duke.50 5 Duke continued to use
the lab equipment after Madey's resignation. °6 Madey then sued
Duke for patent infringement.' The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to Duke, reasoning that Madey failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Duke commercially
benefited or intended to benefit commercially with respect to ei-
ther patent.0 8 The district court held that the experimental use
exception applied to Duke's use of the patented inventions.59
On appeal, Madey asserted that the district court committed
three errors: (1) the district court improperly shifted the burden of
498. Eisenberg, supra note 10; Mueller, supra note 23; David L. Parker, Patent Infringe-
ment Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 Hous. J. INrr' L. 615 (1994); Israelsen, Making,
Using, Selling Without Infringing: an Examination of 35 U.S. C. (e) and the Experimental Use Excep-
tion to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 457 (1989); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in
Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051 (1988).
499. Madey, 307 F.3d 1351; SeeJennifer Miller, Sealing the Coffin on the Experimental Use Ex-
ception, 2003 Dum L. & TECH. REV. 12 (2003).
500. Integra, 331 F.3d 860. For further analysis of the Madey and Integra decisions, see
MARTINJ. ADELMAN, 3-3 PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 3.6(2) (2003).




505. Id. at 1353.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1357.
509. Id.
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proof to Madey to prove that Duke's use was not experimental;
(2) the district court applied an overly broad version of the narrow
experimental use exception; and (3) the district court relied upon
overly general evidence not indicative of the specific propositions
and findings of the experimental use exception.51° The Federal
Circuit agreed with Madey that the district court improperly
shifted the burden of proof, had an overly broad conception of the
experimental use exception, and relied on overly general evidence
to support its finding of experimental use."'
Specifically, the Federal Circuit criticized the district court's
formulations of the experimental use defense as overly broad. The
district court stated that the experimental use defense applied to
uses that "were solely for research, academic, or experimental pur-
poses," and covered uses that were "made for experimental, non-
profit purposes only."512 The Federal Circuit stated that the defense
was "very narrow and strictly limited [to] ... actions performed
'for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry.' , 51 3 "Further, use does not qualify for the experimental use
defense when it is undertaken in the 'guise of scientific inquiry'
but has 'definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial
purposes.' ,'14 "[U]se is disqualified from the defense if it has the
'slightest commercial implication' [and] use in keeping with the
legitimate business of the alleged infringer does not qualify for the
experimental use defense."51 5 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
although major universities "often sanction and fund research pro-
jects with arguably no commercial application whatsoever ... these
projects unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and fac-
ulty participating in these projects, [increasing] the status of the
institution[] and lur[ing] lucrative research grants, students and
faculty.5 6 The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
overemphasized Duke's non-profit nature and stated that the correct
510. Id. at 1361. Madey also argues that the experimental use exception no longer exists
because it is inconsistent with Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997), which held that intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Id. at 1360. The Federal Circuit disagreed with Madey and concluded that the experimental
use defense persists. Id. at 1361.
511. Id. at 1361-1363.
512. Id. at 1361 (quoting district court opinion at 9).
513. Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
514. Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349).
515. Id. (quoting Embrex at 216 F.3d at 1349 and Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106,
1125-26 (Ct. CI. 1976)).
516. Id. at 1363.
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focus should be "on the legitimate business Duke is involved in and
whether or not the use was solely for amusement, to satisfy idle cu-
riosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.
1 7
The Federal Circuit, notwithstanding the call of commentators
to broaden the experimental use exception, has interpreted the
experimental use exception very narrowly and has clearly sent the
following message to universities: unlicensed research using a pat-
ented invention constitutes an unexcused infringement if the
research furthers the institution's legitimate business objectives.
Given the court's extremely broad definition of legitimate business
objectives, neither applied nor basic university research is exempted
from liability for patent infringement.5' 9 The decision makes no dis-
tinction between private-public collaborations for applied research,
government-funded university research, and university research
conducted for purely basic research purposes, i.e., the quest for
knowledge. The Federal Circuit's decision can contribute to the an-
ticommons phenomena, as university researchers must either find
and license patents to basic research tools or risk liability for patent
infringement.
5 0
2. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA-In Integra Lifesciences
I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, the Federal Circuit narrowly interpreted 35
U.S.C. § 271(e) (1)-the safe harbor provision for the use of pat-
ented inventions reasonably related to the development and
submission of information-to satisfy the requirements of the Food
and Drug Administration Act. 521 Section 271 (e) (1) is part of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
which was a compromise between the makers of generic drugs and
research-based pharmaceutical companies.22 Through the Act,
Congress sought to restore the patent term to the drug maker be-
cause of the regulatory delays that result from time-consuming
testing of a new drug prior to approval to sell the drug, and ensure
that a patentee's rights do not de facto extend beyond the statutory
period because a generic drug maker could not enter the market




520. In Integra, Judge Newman, in a dissent, criticizes the Madey majority opinion as fail-
ing to "distinguish between investigation into patented things, as has always been permitted,
and investigation using patented things, as has never been permitted." Id. at 878.
521. 331 F.3d860.
522. Id. at 865.
523. Id.
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drug manufacturer to use a patented drug in preparation for regu-
latory approval. 4 Section 271 (e) (1) provides:
It shall not be an infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States
a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or vet-
erinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4,
1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant
DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other
processes involving site specific genetic manipulation tech-
niques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.
5 2
The Federal Circuit noted the legislative history concerning sec-
tion 271(e)(1), stating that pre-market approval activity involves
"'a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can
establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute,'" while ensur-
ing that the "'nature of the interference with the rights of the
patent holder' not be 'substantial,' but 'de minimus [sic].' ,,526
In Integra, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's hold-
ing that 35 U.S.C. section 271 (e) (1) did not immunize Merck
against liability for infringement of several patents. 527 The issue, as
the court framed it, was whether section 271(e)(1) embraces the
development and identification of new drugs that will, in turn, be
subject to FDA approval, not merely experiments to supply infor-
mation for submission to the FDA.5 2" According to the court, Merck
needed to demonstrate that its activities were "'solely for uses rea-
sonably related to the development and submission of
information'" to the FDA.25 The court noted that "[t]he focus of
the entire exemption is the provision of information to the FDA"
and that "[a] ctivities that do not directly produce information for
the FDA are already straining the relationship to the central pur-
pose of the safe harbor.""53 The court rejected an interpretation of
524. Id.
525. 35U.S.C.§271(e)(1) (1994).
526. Integra, 331 F.3d at 865 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 857 at 8, replinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692).
527. Id. at 868.
528. Id. at 866.
529. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1)).
530. Id.
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section 271(e) (1) that would have expanded the phrase "reasona-
bly related" to include the development of new drugs needing FDA
approval; in other words, section 271 (e) (1) does not immunize
exploratory research that "may rationally form a predicate for
future FDA clinical tests."5"' Notably, the court stated that a broad
interpretation of § 271 (e) (1) would vitiate the exclusive rights of
owners of biotechnology tool patents, because patented tools often
facilitate general research to identify candidate drugs.32 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the research was not "solely the uses
reasonably related" to supplying information to the FDA, because
Merck's activities involved only general biomedical research to
identify new drugs."' Thus, Integra preserves the value of research
tool patents by narrowly interpreting the statutory experimental
use exception 5 4 and arguably contributes to the development of a
Tragedy of the Anticommons.
3. Proposals for a Broader Experimental Use Exception-Prior to the
Integra and Madey decisions, several commentators, including Pro-
fessors Eisenberg and Janice M. Mueller, advocated for a broader
536
experimental use exception. In a 1989 article, Professor
531. Id. at 867.
532. Id. at 866.
533. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1)).
534. Id. at 867.
535. Judge Newman, in a dissenting opinion, argues that the Integra majority decision
"disapproves and essentially eliminates the common law research exemption." Id. at 873. She
states:
The subject matter of patents may be studied in order to understand it, or to improve
upon it, or to find a new use for it, or to modify or 'design around' it. Were such re-
search subject to prohibition by the patentee the advancement of technology would
stop, for the first patentee in the field could bar not only patent-protected competi-
tion, but all research that might lead to such competition, as well as barring
improvement or challenge or avoidance of patented technology. Today's accelerated
technological advance is based in large part on knowledge of the details of patented
inventions and how they are made and used. Prohibition of research into such
knowledge cannot be squared with the framework of patent law .... [The Author
not] undertake to define the boundaries of the research exemption for all purposes
and activities, other than to observe that there is a generally recognized distinction
between 'research' and 'development,' as a matter of scale, creativity, resource alloca-
tion, and often the level of scientific/engineering skill needed for the project; this
distinction may serve as a useful divider, applicable in most situations. Like 'fair use'
in copyright law, the great variety of possible facts may occasionally raise dispute as to
particular cases. However, also like fair use, in most cases it will be clear whether the
exemption applies.
Id. at 875-76 (footnote omitted).
536. See supra note 23. One commentator advocates for the adoption of "a limited re-
search exemption for the public sector (e.g., university), non-commercial research in which
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Eisenberg relies upon literature in sociology, history, and the phi-
losophy of science to reason that free access to discoveries might
promote technological progress more effectively than an exclusive
rights scheme, given the continuing merger of basic and applied
science.5 Eisenberg argues that a three-prong model for the ex-
perimental use exception should be adopted to achieve a balance
between the traditional free access model in basic science and the
proprietary model in applied science.5 3 8 First, Eisenberg proposes
that the experimental use exception should apply to research use
of a patented invention to check the adequacy of the written de-
scription and the validity of the claims.9  Second, the exception
should not apply to "[r] esearch use of a patented invention with a
primary or significant market among research users ... when the
research user is an ordinary consumer of the patented inven-
tion. ,54 Finally, "[a] patent holder should not be entitled to enjoin
the use of a patented invention in subsequent research in the field
of the invention, which could potentially lead to improvements in
the patented technology or to the development of alternative
means of achieving the same purpose.,,541 However, "it might be
appropriate ... to award a reasonable royalty after the fact to be
sure that the patent holder receives an adequate return on the ini-
tial investment in developing the patented invention."
542
In a 2001 article, Mueller expands upon Eisenberg's thesis, tak-
ing into account the substantial increase in transaction costs since
1989, primarily attributable to stacking royalties.543 According to
Mueller, and contrary to one of Eisenberg's assumptions, research
a researcher engages in research with a tool or seeks to better understand how the tool itself
works," and the elimination of reach-through royalties. Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a
Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 347, 409-10 (2004). While reach-through royalties
provisions may create an anticommons, they also provide a useful measure of the contribu-
tion of a research tool to the development of a commercial application. Moreover, the effect
of most reach-through royalty clauses has been diminished through the use of contract
clauses which restrict the total amount of reach-through royalties. Patent pools provide a
better measure to allow parties to value tools. In addition, attempting to define what is non-
commercial versus commercial is difficult and that uncertainty could lead to less investment
in the development of research tools. The continued merger of the public and private
spheres will make it increasingly difficult to continue to define what is non-commercial and
commercial. See NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
537. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1017.
538. Id.




543. Mueller, supra note 23, at 57.
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tools are not readily available, with minimal transaction costs, to
"ordinary users. ' Mueller's article extends Eisenberg's thesis to
permit non-consensual use of research tools that are not readily
available for licensing on reasonable terms or via an anonymous
marketplace purchase.545 Mueller argues that where significant
transaction costs are associated with licensing patented research
tools to develop downstream commercial products, the experimen-
tal use doctrine should exempt from infringement the non-
consensual use of those tools, even if for ultimately commercial546
purposes. She recommends that a "liability rule" be adopted that
prohibits the patent owner from enjoining the non-consensual use
of the research tool, but compensates the patent owner with an ex
post royalty set by the market value of any commercial product de-
veloped with the tool.
547
Mueller further argues that because of the increased collabora-
tion between the public and private sectors, the traditional view
that experimental use does not insulate from infringement re-
search with some commercial purpose using a patented invention
is no longer viable.548 According to Mueller, the current inflexibility
of the experimental use exception, which seeks to categorize re-
search as either for a commercial purpose on the one hand or
merely to satisfy philosophical interest on the other hand, must be
reevaluated.5 49 "The involvement of a for-profit firm in the use of
patented research tools to develop new products should not be
treated as per se outside the scope of the experimental use doc-
trine."550 Mueller relies upon foreign patent systems as examples of
legal rules that exempt experimental or research use of a patented
invention from infringement. 1 For instance, the Federal Supreme
Court of Germany interpreted an exemption for experimental use
of a patented invention to include clinical trials of a patented
pharmaceutical, even though "the trials were conducted for the




545. Id. at 58.
546. Id. at 9.
547. Id. at 9-10.
548. Id. at 36. Undoubtedly, Mueller would not be supportive of Madey v. Duke University,
which did not even involve public and private collaboration, but concerned almost purely
university research.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 37.
551. Id. at 37-40.
552. Id. at 38. (citing Wolfgang von Meibom &Johann Pitz, Experimental Use and Compul-
sory License Under German Patent Law, PATENT WoRLD,June/July 1997, at 29).
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Mueller cites the NIH Working Group on Research Tools, which
concluded that "foreign patent systems properly distinguish be-
tween 'experimenting on the patented invention-i.e., using a
patented invention to study the underlying technology or perhaps
to invent around the patent,' and 'experimenting with a patented
invention to study something else.' ,113 Mueller argues that if trans-
action costs are severe enough to impede the development of new
commercial products, then the line drawing between "experiment-
ing on" and "experimenting with" is no longer justified. While
Mueller recognizes that the NIH Working Group's concern about
undermining incentives to produce and disseminate research tools
is valid if all non-consensual users of tools are exempted from li-
ability, an approach that Mueller believes will preserve incentives is
to impose a liability rule, i.e., the patent owner can obtain "an ex
post royalty based on the marketplace valuation of products devel-
oped through use of the tool. '5 54 According to Mueller, the
researcher's "access problem is alleviated because a license need
not be negotiated prior to the use and an appropriate level of roy-
alty to the patent holder will ensure that incentives to innovate are
not significantly decreased., 555 In Mueller's model, the proposed
user of the patented research tool will have to provide notice to the
owner of the patent prior to use or be subject to treble damages if
infringement is eventually proved.5 6
4. Analysis of the Proposal for a Broader Experimental Use Exception-
Extension of the experimental use exception to include uses of
research tools for some or any commercial purpose would effec-
tively destroy the market for those tools, thus removing any
incentives to create research tools.5 57 Even an extension that does
not completely end the market for research tools could impair the
553. Id. at 39 (quoting NIH REPORT, supra note 2.)
554. Id. at 40.
555. Id.
556. Id. at 58-59.
557. NIH REPORT, supra note 2:
It is difficult to imagine how a broader research exemption could be formulated
without effectively eviscerating the value of patents on research tools. Researchers are
ordinary consumers of patented research tools, and if these consumers were exempt
from infringement liability, the patent holder would have nowhere else to turn to col-
lect patent royalties. An excessively broad research exemption would eliminate
incentives for private firms to develop and disseminate new research tools, which on
balance do more harm than good to the research enterprise.
Id. See also Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 407, at 19 (arguing that withholding patent pro-
tection from research tools could undermine their creation and distribution).
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incentive to invent that the patent grant provides. This is espe-
cially true in the biotechnology industry, where patents are
necessary for companies to obtain venture capital funding: Ven-
ture capitalists that currently invest in biotechnology companies
may stop investing, because the value of the intellectual property
portfolio of a company will be severely impacted if the company
has no effective ability to exclude others from using its patented
invention or if the company's ability to exclude others is uncer-
tain.560 The boundaries of the exclusive right would not be known
until the experimental use exception had been litigated. It is diffi-
cult to value or set the royalty for use of a research tool, especially
one that arguably does not contribute directly to the creation of a
commercially successful product. For example, if a user utilizes a
research tool to determine that a particular research course is a
failure, but ultimately develops a commercially successful product,
does the owner of the research tool receive a royalty? The user
clearly has received some value. If the court applies the experimen-
tal use exception, the court must determine the amount of the
royalty ex post;56 1 in other words, the court must set the license
fee.5 While a court can determine a license fee, a patent pool is
558. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1074 ("An exemption from infringement liability for
research users would deprive patent holders of some of the social value of their inventions,
thereby reducing the value of patents and weakening patent incentives. Whether such an
exemption is nonetheless desirable in the interest of promoting continuing scientific pro-
gress is ultimately an empirical question.").
559. See supra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
560. Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a
Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2179-2181 (1991):
A system with a broad experimental use allowance would have a disparate impact on
less well-financed inventors whose ability to conduct R&D may be limited in the short
term when they are not able to convince possible investors of the potential commer-
cial success of their patented inventions. If larger, well-funded competitors are able to
utilize the patented inventions of smaller inventors to develop their own patented al-
ternatives, these smaller inventors will be less able to raise funds for R&D. The
experimental use exception, thus, could very well have a dampening effect on small
scale, highly speculative R&D inventive endeavors, which scholars have recognized as
comprising a substantial portion of the overall innovative activity in the United States.
Id. at 2183 (citing F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
416-17 (2d ed. 1980) andJ. Lowe & N. Crawford, Innovation & Technology Transfer for the
Growing Firm 33 (1984)).
561. Cf Merges, supra note 486, at 1317 ("Unless a special 'rate court' were established
to administer these [licensing] disputes, each judge in each case would have to be educated
about the industry, about appropriate [intellectual property rights] valuation ranges, and
the like. These costs would clearly be large ...
562. Id.
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arguably better equipped to deal with such a matter.563 Accordingly,
a broad exemption encompassing the use of research tools for
commercial purposes, by failing to ensure the patent owner's abil-
ity to recoup investments in research and development, could
disable the incentives to invent and innovate that patents pro-
vide.564
A broad experimental use exception might also result in public
disclosure of fewer research tools. Inventors may desire to keep
research tools secret instead of disclosing those inventions through
patents. This is especially likely because research tools are rarely
disclosed through the sale of the patented commercial applications
developed using the tools. Moreover, there are several beneficial
non-infringing uses of information contained in a patent or a pat-
ented invention. For example, a researcher may study a patent,
take good ideas from a patent, and verify an invention for operabil-
ity, proof of principle, and proof of verification.565 Accordingly,
researchers may decide not to disclose research tools and rely on
trade secret law for protection, and this would hurt scientific pro-
gress by not allowing other researchers to study patents or adopt
good ideas from patents.
D. Collective Rights Organizations
Historically, institutions have used collective rights organiza-
tions, such as patent pools, to overcome transactional hurdles
involved in accumulating the numerous intellectual property rights
necessary to create a commercial application.566 "A 'patent pool' is
an agreement by two or more parties to license one or more pat-
ents to one another or to third parties.",6 7 A patent pool also can be
defined as "the aggregation of intellectual property rights which
are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they are transferred di-
rectly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, such as a
joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool.''5m
563. Id. at 1296.
564. Karp, supra note 560, at 2180.
565. See Biotech Strategies, supra note 147; Karp, supra note 560, at 2179-81.
566. Merges, supra note 486, at 1342-1352 (describing patent pools in automobile and
aircraft industries). See also Carlson, supra note 180, at 373.
567. White Paper, supra note 25.
568. Joel I. Klein, An Address to the American Intellectual Property Association on the Subject of
Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law (May 2, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/1123.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform):
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A few recently successful patent pools include the MPEG-2 pool
and two pools related to Digital Versatile Discs .5 6 Additionally, in
the golden rice problem discussed below, several institutions570
formed an initiative called the "Public Sector Intellectual Property
Resource for Agriculture" ("PIPRA") .571 One of PIPRA's goals is to
create shared technology practices, including "the possibility of
pooling specific public-sector technologies, making technology
'packages' available to member institutions and to the private sec-
tor for commercial licensing or, at the very least, for designated
humanitarian or special use.",
7
1
All patent pools share one fundamental characteristic: they provide a regularized
transactional mechanism that takes the place of the statutory property rule baseline
requiring an individual bargain for each transaction. But in most other respects, their
characteristics vary. They range from huge, industry-wide institutions with dozens of
members and hundreds of patents, to relatively simple arrangements that look like
nothing more than multilateral relational contracts.
Id. Merges, supra note 486, at 1342.
569. Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent
Pools 28-37 (1999), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/
pools.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). (describing DVD
pools and MPEG-2 pools approved by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice).
570. The institutions include: University of Wisconsin-Madison; University of California
System; University of California-Davis; University of California-Riverside; University of Flor-
ida; The Ohio State University; Rutgers, The State University of NewJersey; North Carolina
State University; Michigan State University; Cornell University; Boyce Thompson Institute
for Plant Research; Donald Danforth Plant Science Center; Rockefeller Foundation and
McKnight Foundation. See PUBLIC SECTOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESOURCE FOR AGRI-
CULTURE, at http://www.pipra.participants.php (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
571. Atkinson, supra note 381, at 174-175. In forming PIPRA, the institutions recog-
nized that "[w] hen IP rights for agricultural materials and technologies are held by multiple
public- and private-sector owners, this fragmentation produces situations where no single
institution can provide a commercial partner with a complete set of IP rights to ensure free-
dom to operate ... with a particular technology." Id. at 174. PIPRA participants believe that,
if public sector institutions would collaborate in gathering information about and in the use
of agricultural IPRs, the collaboration would make it easier for them to fulfill part of their
public missions by speeding the creation and commercialization of improved staple and
specialty crops. Id. at 175.
572. Id. at 175; see also Public Sector Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture,
supra note 570. PIPRA is also exploring the development of pilot projects, developing a
business model for PIPRA, proving information, engaging other organizations, and stimulat-
ing discussions. It is unclear whether PIPRA as currently formed will be a success or not.
Serious issues remain such as to whom will technology packages be licensed and for what
purpose. Moreover, there is an open question as to what rights will be reserved by the uni-
versities. However, it serves as a model for the possible pooling of biomedical research tools
by the public sector. A requirement to retain rights for later pooling for specific purposes
can also be used in the biomedical field. While those rights are likely only the rights gath-
ered from public institutions, those practices will somewhat relieve the pressure from a
potential anticommons. At least for some rights, instead of gathering rights from 10 parties,
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
1. Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property-While patent
pools can be used to overcome transactional barriers, they are
nonetheless subject to antitrust review. Patent pools have served
as fronts for suspect collusive behavior, such as price fixing and
preserving invalid patents. 574 Those practices have led federal regu-
lators and courts to view licensing practices, including patent
pools, with suspicion.7 ' Recently, however, federal regulators and
courts have recognized that patent law and antitrust law serve
complementary purposes: "'both are aimed at encouraging inno-
vation, industry and competition.' ,57' The largest impediment to
the formation of patent pools includes antitrust scrutiny of patent
pool arrangements.577
In 1995, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice jointly issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property ("Guidelines") .Y The Guidelines "describe
the agencies' current complementary approach to applying anti-
a developer may only need to license rights from 3 parties. The collective pressure from
universities may encourage private companies to join in these pools.
573. White Paper, supra note 25, at 5.
574. Bradley J. Levang, Comment, Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A
Refutation to the USPIO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 229, 244-246 (2002).
575. The trend towards narrowing the types of conduct exempt from antitrust scrutiny
culminated in the 1970s with a now-infamous government policy called the 'Nine No-Nos'
that was first articulated in a speech by a DOJ official. The Nine No-Nos were certain types of
conduct that the Department always regarded as suspect and likely to unreasonably harm
competition.
Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5 (2000). The Nine No-Nos included: a patentee requiring a licensee to grant
back patented improvements to the licencee's original technology; setting of royalty pay-
ments in amounts unrelated to sales volume of patented product; tying of unpatented
supplies; post-sale restrictions on resale by purchasers of patented products; tie-outs; licen-
see veto power over the licensor's grant of future licenses; mandatory package licensing;
restrictions on sales of unpatented products made by a patented process; and specifying the
prices a licensee could charge upon resale of licensed products. Id. at 6.
576. Anthony, supra note 575, at 7. (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
577. Shapiro, supra note 190, at 144:
We can ill afford to further raise transaction costs by making it difficult for patentees
possessing complementary and potentially blocking patents to coordinate to engage
in crosslicensing, package licensing, or to form patent pools. Yet antitrust law can po-
tentially play such a counterproductive role, especially since antitrust jurisprudence
starts with a hostility toward cooperation among horizontal rivals.... [T]he Federal
Trade Commission ... arguably is making it more difficult for firms to engage in
crosslicenses, to offer package licenses, or to form pro-competitive patent pools.
Id.
578. Anthony, supra note 575, at 7.
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trust principles in cases involving intellectual property rights."579
Moreover, the Guidelines specifically apply the principles of par-
ticular licensing practices, such as cross-licensing arrangements,
pooling, or the acquisition of intellectual property rights.
58 0
The Guidelines specify that intellectual property pooling may
provide "procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary
technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking posi-
tions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation." '  Moreover,
"[b]y promoting the dissemination of technology, cross-licensing
and pooling arrangements are often procompetitive.'  Pooling
arrangements, however, can be anticompetitive if. "the excluded
firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant market for the
good incorporating the licensed technologies, the pool partici-
pants collectively possess market power in the relevant market, and
the limitations on participation are not reasonably related to the
efficient development and exploitation of the pooled technolo-
gies."58 3 Additionally, "[a]nother possible anticompetitive effect of
pooling arrangements may occur if the arrangement deters or dis-
courages participants from engaging in research and development,
thus retarding innovation."04 "However, such an arrangement can
have procompetitive benefits, for example, by exploiting econo-
mies of scale and integrating complementary capabilities of the
pool members (including the clearing of blocking positions), and
is likely to cause competitive problems only when the arrangement
includes a large fraction of the potential research and develop-
ment in an innovation market."5 8 The Guidelines are collapsed
579. Id.
580. See id. at 8.
581. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES].
582. Id.
583. White Paper, supra note 25, at 7 (quoting Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attor-
ney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Carey Ramos, Esq. (June 10, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)).
584. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 581, at § 5.5.
585. Id.
The Justice Department has applied these guidelines in considering and approving
three proposed patent pools. Its first review set forth the following additional guide-
lines: (1) the patents in the pool must be valid and not expired, (2) no aggregation
of competitive technologies and setting a single price for them, (3) an independent
expert should be used to determine whether a patent is essential to complement
technologies in the pool, (4) the pool agreement must not disadvantage competitors
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into two questions: (1) "'whether the proposed licensing program
is likely to integrate complementary patent rights' "; and (2) "'if so,
whether the resulting competitive benefits are likely to be out-
weighed by competitive harm posed by other aspects of the
program.' ,586
X. PROPOSALS FOR USING PATENT POOLS TO
OVERCOME THICKETS OF PATENTS
Professor Merges argues that collective rights organizations,
such as patent pools, are better suited to overcome thickets of in-
tellectual property rights than are compulsory licenses because
knowledgeable industry participants set the rules of exchange, in-
cluding valuation and royalty rates, which are both more likely to
represent market bargains.8 7 Merges argues that patent pools are
more likely to form when industry participants are required to
transact with one another multiple times and when participants
can work out a scheme more consistent with their needs than a
congressional one-size-fits-all solution. Merges specifically dis-
cusses the application of patent pools to solve patent thicket issues
in the multimedia industry.5 s9 Moreover, commentators argue that
patent pools may be used to overcome a potential Tragedy of the
in downstream product markets, and (5) the pool participants must not collude on
prices outside the scope of the pool, e.g., on downstream products.
Id. White Paper, supra note 25, at 7.
586. White Paper, supra note 25, at 7.
In analyzing these issues, the Justice Department focused on the patents to be licensed
(i.e., an independent expert in the relevant technology determines that they are "essen-
tial" to complementing the central technology in the pool), the joint licensing
arrangement (i.e., collusion is unlikely, access to technology is enhanced), and the posi-
tive effects on innovation (e.g., the pool participants are required to license to each
other "essential" patents they obtain in the future, less of a chance for future "blocking"
patents, newer patents weigh heavier in calculating royalties to patent owners).
Id.
587. See Merges, supra note 486, at 1294-1300. Professor Merges argues that intellectual
property rights are property rule entitlements and the high costs of transferring those rights
leads to the creation of a liability rule-like regime based on collective valuation by firms. Id
at 1302-03.
588. See id. at 1299. "[RIepeat-play makes it easier to reach agreement on any particular
issue, because disparities tend to balance out over many transactions." Id. at 1341.
589. See id. at 1373-90.
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Anticommons in biotechnology.590 The USPTO also advocates the
use of patent pools to overcome the access problems that excessive
591
biotechnology patents pose.
In a white paper issued by the USPTO, the authors argue that a
patent pool can eliminate problems associated with blocking
patents or stacking licenses, while simultaneously encouraging
cooperative efforts needed to effect true economic and social
benefits of biotechnology invention.5 9 Pools also potentially
remove licensing transaction costs such as litigation, which
provides certainty of patent rights and saves businesses time and
money, especially small business that cannot survive costly• • • 593
litigation.. Pools also create an efficient mechanism for obtaining
patented technologies, removing the opportunity for the last party
with necessary rights to holdout for a substantially higher royaltythan oher " 594
than other licensees. Patent pools also efficiently distribute risk
because the pool provides an incentive for further innovation by
enabling its members to share risks associated with research and
development.595 Pools ensure that all participants recover some of
its costs for research and development efforts. 96 Finally, pools
provide a way for the free sharing of technical information related
to patented technology between members and the pool's
licensees. 7 Members are also less likely to engage in overlapping
efforts because of their greater access to information.9
The authors also address some of the criticisms of patent
pools.59 9 The first common criticism is that patent pools may in-
clude patented alternatives that could compete with a certain
technology69 According to the authors, this criticism can be ad-
dressed through the careful evaluation of patent pool participants
590. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 700. See also Shapiro, supra note 190;
Lawrence M. Sung, Greater Predictability May Result in Patent Pools, NAT'L L.J.,June 22, 1998, at
C2, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417awrencemsungl.pdf (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (arguing that Federal Circuit decisions
limiting the scope of seemingly broad claims issued by the USTPO may result in more insti-
tutions participating in patent pools).
591. White Paper, supra note 25, at 2.
592. Id. at 8.
593. Id. at 8-9.
594. Id. at 9.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 10.
598. See id.
599. Id. at 10-11.
600. Id. at 10.
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to ensure that the patents are truly blocking.'O The second com-
mon criticism is that pools can shield potentially invalid patents.
60 2
If a pool shields a potentially invalid patent, then consumers may
pay royalties for products with patents that courts would have oth-
erwise invalidated.6 °3 The authors argue that an independent
expert can review and select the patents to be added to the pool.
60 4
Moreover, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission provide some oversight of patent pools. 60 5 Finally, patent
pools are criticized as detrimental to competition because they en-
courage collusion and price fixing.6 6 The authors argue that
careful evaluation of patent pools under the Guidelines, and the
threat of antitrust violations and treble damages, should discour-
age the formation of anticompetitive patent pools.
60 7
The work of Professor Carl Shapiro supports the white paper's
recommendations.w8 Professor Shapiro cautions:
we can ill afford to raise transaction costs by making it diffi-
cult for patentees possessing complementary and potentially
blocking patents to coordinate to engage in cross-licensing,
package licensing, or to form patent pools. Yet antitrust law
can potentially play such a counterproductive role, especially
since antitrust jurisprudence starts with a hostility towards co-
operation among horizontal rivals.6 9
Patent pools provide a solution to the Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons problem and preserve the incentives to invent, disclose, and
innovate. Patent pools reduce transaction costs and potential litiga-
tion costs associated with bargaining with multiple parties to obtain
rights.6 10 Importantly, patent pools allow industry participants to
select experts to evaluate licenses, more nearly representing a mar-
611ket valuation than a court or legislative determination. In






606. Id. at 11.
607. Id. The White Paper also discusses three recent successful patent pools: MPEG-2
Standard (1997), DVD-ROM and DVD-Video Formats 1 (1998), and DVD-ROM and DVD-
Video Formats 11 (1999). Id. at 13-15.
608. Shapiro, supra note 190, at 28.
609. Id. at 28.
610. Merges, supra note 486, at 1296-1301.
611. See id. at 1295-96.
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the formation of the pool. However, hold-ups may still occur at the
initial formation of the pool. Pools also reduce the likelihood that
parties participating in the pool will engage in overlapping re-
search efforts.
While the threat of antitrust liability and treble damages might
provide a deterrent to the use of patent pools for anticompetitive
purposes, government regulators and courts should approach and
review patent pools with care to ensure that pools are not being
used improperly. Improper purposes may include shielding invalid
or unenforceable patents, or naked price-fixing.1 2 If an arrange-
ment is being used solely for the purpose of naked price-fixing, a
per se, or "quick look," analysis is warranted . Otherwise, patents
pools should be analyzed under a rule of reason.6 14 The rule of rea-
son analysis identifies anticompetitive effects and balances these
effects against procompetitive benefits. 6 5 As discussed above, anti-
competitive effects can include "price-fixing, anticompetitive
exclusionary practices, and the foreclosure of competition in re-
lated markets. Procompetitive benefits include the clearing of
blocking positions, the advantages flowing from integrating com-
plementary technologies, and the cost savings from avoiding
litigation. 6
If anticompetitive effects exist, the analysis [inquires] whether
the arrangement is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive
benefits that outweigh the anticompetitive effects. One important
factor in determining whether a restraint is 'reasonably necessary'
is to consider whether the parties could have achieved the pro-
competitive efficiencies through the use of significantly less
restrictive alternatives.1 7
Though pools can have anticompetitive effects, pooled patented
technologies can be carefully evaluated to ensure that those pat-
ents are complementary or blocking, and not competing.618
However, patented research tools are not always blocking or com-
plementary in the sense that the research tool is included within
the commercial application itself. Research tools may be needed to
conduct or simplify the research and development of a commercial
application. Thus, independent experts, regulators, and the courts
612. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 52, at § 34.4a.
613. Id. at § 34.4a n.2.
614. See id. at § 34.4a.
615. See id.
616. Id. at § 34.4a2.
617. Id.
618. See id. at § 34.4b1.
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must ensure that a research tool is "necessary" for the particular
research and development agenda of the pool at the time of the
formation of the pool. The definition of "necessary" must be
evaluated in light of the purpose or use of the particular patented
research tool. At the time of the formation of the pool, however, it
may be unclear whether a tool is needed to develop a particular
commercial application because of the uncertain nature of bio-
technology research and development. 9 Accordingly, where
research tools used to develop a product are neither blocking nor
complementary but are still needed to efficiently develop a particu-
lar commercial application, regulators and courts should not
determine that a patent pool has anticompetitive effects that out-
weigh its procompetitive benefits. The use of a research tool to
determine that a particular research and development agenda will
not produce a useful commercial application provides a benefit to
all members of the patent pool, even though that particular tool is
not "necessary" to develop a commercial application. In determin-
ing whether a patent pool with patented research tools fails or
passes the rule of reason test, regulators and courts should con-
sider the realities of the market, including the uncertainty and
complexity of biotechnology research and development, the trans-
action costs in licensing numerous patents directed to research
tools, and the necessity of using numerous research tools to de-
velop a single commercial application. In addition, pools of
patented research tools allowing the licensing of the pooled tech-
nologies to parties outside the pool should be viewed as
620procompetitive. Meanwhile, patent pools allowing veto rights
over licensing of pooled technologies are more likely to have anti-
competitive effects.
62'
Patent pools can be used to overcome a Tragedy of the Anti-
commons that exists or may develop in the biotechnology sector.
Patent pools including patented research tools can have procom-
petitive effects and can withstand antitrust scrutiny. As discussed
below, government policy makers should encourage biotechnology
industry participants to enter patent pools.
619. In addition, new patented technologies added to the pool after its initial formation
must be carefully evaluated to ensure the technology is necessary to develop a particular
commercial application,
620. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 52, at § 34.4b2.
621. See id.
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XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because it is unclear whether a Tragedy of the Anticommons ex-
ists or will develop, this Article recommends against a change in
patent law doctrine that may upset the incentives that patent law
provides to invent, disclose, and innovate. A weakening of the pat-
ent grant might discourage investment in uncertain and expensive
biotechnology research and development, which, in turn, will re-
sult in fewer socially useful commercial applications being brought
to market. Weaker patent rights may also discourage firms from
entering the biotechnology market because those firms will not be
able to obtain venture capital funding.
This Article proposes two recommendations. First, this Article
recommends that the government commission a study similar to
that described in House Bill 3966.622 Second, this Article recom-
mends that the government take certain actions to facilitate the
entering of patent pools by public and private institutions.
A. Study of the Effect of Government Policy
on Biotechnology Innovation
Because of the conflicting nature of prior studies concerning
the presence of a Tragedy of the Anticommons in biotechnology,
and the importance of biotechnology innovation to the public
health and economic welfare of the United States, the government
should commission a study of the effect of government innovation
policy on science and technology innovation in the biotechnology
industry. In 2002, Representative Lynn N. Rivers of Michigan
introduced a bill, the "Genomic Science and Technology
Innovation Act of 2002" ("Genomic Act") in the House of
Representatives, which "provides for an in-depth study by the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy on the
impact of Federal policies, especially patent policies, on the rate of
innovation, the cost, and the availability of genomic
technologies."623 However, Congress failed to enact the Genomic
Act. This Article proposes that Congress should enact a slightly
modified version of the Genomic Act. The changes in the
622. H.R. 3966, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
cl07query.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
623. 148 CONG. Rac. E354 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Rivers).
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proposed Act ensure that the study include an examination of the
impact of the patenting of research tools on biotechnology
innovation and an analysis of government policies, including the
Bayh-Dole Act, both of which affect innovation. The following
sections provide the recommended changes to the Genomic Act:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Geinaiie [Biotechnology] Sci-
ence and Technology Innovation Act of 4OW [2004]." [Ed.:
The title sounds redundant-Biotechnology Technology.]
SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Ccnonmic sciznce [Biotechnology] promises a revolution
in the development of new and effective ge,'tenie [biotech-
nology] techniques and other innovations, and it is in the
national interest to speed the development and deployment
of these new technologies through policies that promote in-
novation in the field of geftmie [biotechnology] science and
technology.
(2) While Federal innovation policies can help stimulate in-
novation by attracting capital investment to the development
of commercial products, such policies can also inhibit basic
research and hinder sharing of information that is the basis of
scientific progress, thereby slowing the innovation process.
(3) Intellectual property policies for gentnie [biotechnol-
ogy] science and technology products are being implemented
without an adequate understanding and consideration of the
net impact of such policies on the innovation process.
(4) Decisions about intellectual property policy being made
now are likely to have significant impacts on basic research
and the development of gcncnic teehnolo [biotechnology]
for decades to come.
(5) The Office of Science and Technology Policy is uniquely
positioned to lead the development of a coordinated, inter-
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agency policy to promote innovation in gcmic cicr.zc and
eehnoegy [biotechnology]. A definitive study coordinated by
the Office of Science and Technology that identifies the im-
pacts of Federal innovation policy on the innovation pipeline
for g i -tc clagy [biotechnology] and includes rec-
ommendations for policies, including any statutory changes
needed to optimize the gnmic zhnl [biotechnology]
innovation pipeline, would contribute significantly to the de-
velopment of the policy.
SECTION 3. STUDY
(a) Requirement. The Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy shall conduct, or may contract with the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences to conduct, a study that assess the
impact of Federal policies, including intellectual property
policies, on the innovation process for genoffiic t ̂-h-lgie
[biotechnology].
(b) Consultation. In conducting the study, the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy shall consult with the
National Science and Technology Council, the National Sci-
ence Foundation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and
other agencies or divisions of agencies the Director considers
appropriate.
(c) Advisory Committee. In conducting the study, the Direc-
tor of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall
consult with a committee, organized as a subcommittee of the
President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technol-
ogy, that shall include balanced membership from research
universities, [including technology transfer professionals and
research scientists;] non-profit research institutions; industry,
[including members from the pharmaceutical and biotech-
nology industry]; economists [;] legal experts [;] bioethicists[;]
clinicians and clinical scientists [;] genetic practitioners [;] and
advocacy groups.
(d) Contents. The study shall-
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(1) identify and quantify, to [the] extent possible, the actual
and reasonably expected effects of innovation policy on ge-
fli C ^^: ..nee and tehn legy [biotechnology] innovation;
(2) explicitly consider various alternative levels of intellec-
tual property protection geemie [biotechnology] materials
may receive and the likely impact of the various levels of pro-
tection of each element of the innovation pipeline,
including-
(A) fundamental genomie [biotechnology] research carried
out at universities and other nonprofit research institutions;
(B) commercial genemie [biotechnology] research at univer-
sities, nonprofit research institutions, and for-profit
institutions, including the expected effects on intra-company
investment and external private capital;
(C) development of commercial ganomic .......... [bio-
technologies and research tools], including the expected
effects on investment capital; and
(D) access to g.. mi- tehnolegi s [biotechnology prod-
ucts,] edn processes[, and research tools]; and
(3) include an assessment of the net impact of Federal inno-
vation policies on innovation for genomic tchnloogice
[biotechnologies], including an assessment of-
(A) researchers' access to genemie [biotechnology] materials
[and research tools];
(B) the rate of innovation;
(c) the quality of innovation;
(D) the cost of new genoemie [biotechnology and research
tools];
(E) the impact of restricted access to [biotechnology] diag-
nostics on evaluation, improvement, and clinical utilization;
(F) the cost and availability of innovative technology;
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(G) whether Federal innovation policies create barriers to re-
search through denial of use of a research tool, increased
costs of licensing, legal and litigation costs, transaction costs,
or the perception of increased legal liability, or hinder the ac-
cess of researchers to getemtie [biotechnology] materials and
to databases of genomic sequence information;
(H) whether Federal innovation policies affect the choice of
area of research conducted by researchers or institutions or
provide positive benefits to such research, including addi-
tional funding from private sector partners; and
(I) the range of incentives providing motivation for genetics
research and technology development other than intellectual
property protection.
SECTION 4. REPORT
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
shall, within 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
transmit a report to Congress that-
(1) contains the findings of the study conducted under sec-
tion 3; and
(2) makes recommendations for policies, including legisla-
tive changes, needed to optimize the gcnmic ... h.logy
[biotechnology] innovation pipeline.
SECTION 5. COORDINATED POLICY
After the report is transmitted to Congress under section 4,
the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
shall incorporate the policy recommendations into a coordi-
nated interagency policy to promote innovation in gcnie ,,e
sin. and te.hn.gy [biotechnology], including the sound
use of intellectual property policy.
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SECTION 6. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "geitmie [biotechnology] materials" means any
material containing a human or human pathogen polynucleo-
tide sequence other than genetic probes and markers and
transgenic organisms;
(2) the term "genemic tcc ohnag-" [ biotechnology"] means
any genetic diagnostic methods or kits, tools, probes, or
markers, and any pharmaceutical or therapy ucs cr inccrpc
rates [developed with, using, or incorporating genomic
materials];
(3) [the term "research tools" shall include, but is not limited
to a fragment of a gene, a gene, cell lines, monoclonal antibod-
ies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial
chemistry, and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools, meth-
ods, laboratory equipment, and machines;] and
(3) the term "innovation policy" includes intellectual property
protection and policies, [including, but not limited to, the
Bayh-Dole Act].
B. Facilitate Creation of Patent Pools
The complex nature of the development of commercial applica-
tions in the biotechnology sector often requires multiple private
and public firms to collaborate and exchange specialized skills and
proprietary inputs. If transaction costs for transferring patented
research tools are not minimized, these firms may be unable to as-
semble the necessary rights to bring a product or service to market.
Patent pools provide a way to minimize transaction costs and facili-
tate the transfer of proprietary rights. Moreover, patent pools
represent a solution that likely does not undermine the incentives
for investment in biotechnology research and development, and is
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consistent with the desire of scientists in academia and industry to
streamline access to research tools.
62 4
Government policy should encourage the creation of patent
pools in two ways. First, the government, in collaboration with uni-
versities and private firms, should create a public database that
contains information concerning proprietary and public domain
research tools, including the identity of the owner, licensor, and/or
licensee of each proprietary research tool; and a description of
those tools. The information concerning research tools that are
kept as trade secrets can be minimal, merely identifying the owner,
contact information, and a very brief description of the tool.
6 5 In-
formation concerning research tools that are patented can be
more detailed, and include the patent. Similarly, the database can
describe in detail research tools dedicated to the public domain.
The database would reduce transaction costs in determining
whether a particular technology is subject to a proprietary right
and in searching for the identity and contact information for the
potential licensor. Through the use of a public database, partici-
pants would be able to quickly determine which rights are
necessary to develop a particular commercial application or follow
a particular research agenda. The public database would also allow
researchers to determine whether a particular research tool has
been developed, thus providing notice to researchers not to waste
valuable resources pursuing development of an 
existing tool.6
26
Moreover, as a result of the golden rice problem discussed above,
universities and foundations now realize the benefits of a public
database and are forming one to overcome any anticommons in
the development of agricultural products.62 '7 The PIPRA database, if
successful, could serve as a model.
Second, the Bayh-Dole Act should be amended to allow the gov-
ernment to retain a nonexclusive license to any patented
technology developed with the use of federal funding. The Bayh-
Dole Act currently provides that the government may either limit
the recipient's right to elect title to an invention or retain title itself
"in exceptional circumstances when it is determined by the agency
624. See NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
625. This may create the added benefit of creating a market for research tools main-
tained as trade secrets.
626. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 62, at 307-08 (discussing rent dissipating races
to develop same technology by competing firms). See also Ko, supra note 54, at 795-96 ("Se-
crecy can also lead to waste to the extent that competitors duplicate research.").
627. Atkinson, supra note 381, at 174 (discussing goal of forming a collective public IP
asset database, "so that public-sector researchers can be informed about FrO [freedom to
operate] obstacles at the initiation of their research").
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that restriction or elimination of the right to retain title to any sub-
ject invention will better promote the policy and objectives of this
chapter.,628 The policy and objectives of the Act include:
[T]o use the patent system to promote the utilization of in-
ventions arising from federally supported research or
development; to encourage maximum participation of small
business firms in federally supported research and develop-
ment efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial
concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities;
to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations
and small business firms are used in a manner to promote
free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering
future research and discovery; to promote the commercializa-
tion and public availability of inventions made in the United
States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the
Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect
the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions;
and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this
629area.
As currently drafted, the Bayh-Dole Act requires the government
to designate a case of exceptional circumstances at the time of the
government's award of funding, which could be difficult."' At that
time, the government may not know whether particular federally
funded research will result in a research tool or not.61 The NIH
Working Group recommends that the NIH use this authority as a
means to ensure broad dissemination of research tools. 632 However,
adopting a policy that requires the government to retain title for
all inventions created with federal funding may provide disincen-
tives for public and private collaborations to develop research tools
with federal funding. Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, less
than four percent of all government-funded research was commer-
cialized.633 Moreover, a blanket policy reserving title to the
628. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (ii) (2000).
629. 35 U.S.C. § 200.
630. See id. at § 202 (a) (ii); see also NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
631. See NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
632. See id.
633. See EPsTEIN, supra note 2, at § 11.7 (citing Lobenstein, Future of University-Industry
Licensing, 25 LES NOUVELLES 138 (1990)).
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government may result in less commercialization of innovations
that are not research tools.
The Bayh-Dole Act also currently provides that in all inventions
created with government funding, the government retains "a non-
exclusive, non-transferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice
or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject
invention throughout the world .... ,,6s, This license allows the gov-
ernment to use any patented research tool in the course of
federally sponsored research without liability for patent infringe-
ment.53 5 It is unclear whether this provision applies to samples of
research materials and whether the government can authorize use
of subject inventions by other recipients of NIH grants.
636
These two sections, along with the limited "march in" rights that
the government retains, provide evidence of current government
policy to secure for the government limited rights to patented in-
ventions created with federal funding. To facilitate the ability of
parties to enter patent pools, the Act should be revised to state that
the government retains "a non-exclusive, transferable, license to
make, use, offer to sell, sell, and import the patented invention
throughout the world." However, the Act should specify that the
government will only exercise that right if it is necessary to license
those rights to a patent pool to ensure dissemination of a research
tool. The Act should further state that the research tool is to be
licensed only if the exclusive licensor unreasonably withholds the
license from a patent pool. The question of unreasonableness will
depend upon whether the potential licensor is attempting to hold
up the potential licensees, whether the potential licensor's right is
the last of several rights needed to create a commercial applica-
tion, and whether the licensor is currently using the technology to
develop an application. A patent pool would be defined as the
need to pool two or more patented technologies in order to de-
velop a commercial application or follow a particular research
agenda to create a commercial application. The government would
pay any proceeds from the patent pool to the party holding out.
Both the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice
is well equipped to evaluate whether a potential licensor is unrea-
sonably withholding a license to a patented research tool from a
patent pool.
637
634. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (4) (2000).
635. See NIH REPORT, supra note 2.
636. See id.
637. The DOJ and FTC are particularly well-suited to perform this task considering the
current conflict of interest scandal at the National Institutes of Health. See David Labrador,
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These changes are justifiable for several reasons. One of the
primary justifications for the Bayh-Dole Act is the need for tide to
inventions to vest in private firms to encourage commercialization
of an invention created with government funding. However, with
research tools, there already exists a market for those tools, and
often the creator of a research tool may not use or be equipped to
use that tool to develop a commercial application. Thus, providing
title to an invention created with government funding might be
unnecessary for the continued commercialization of the research
tool itself. In addition, the public has already paid once for the re-
search tool and should not be taxed again at a high rate simply
because a company that refuses to license government funded
proprietary technology has chosen to hold things up. Moreover,
the licensor's rights are still protected and should be protected
enough to allow continued investment in the development of re-
search tools. The license is only to be used whenever the licensor is
engaged in behavior that unfairly stifles innovation and only when
the licensor is refusing to join a patent pool. Additionally, the li-
censor is still entitled to recover royalties, a factor that should
somewhat dampen any disincentive to invent.
The effect of this proposal is substantial because the government
currently funds approximately 26% of total research and develop-
ment in the United States and 58% of research and development
6391in U.S. colleges and universities.
The proposals of creating a public database and modifying the
Bayh-Dole Act promise to provide increased access to research
tools to public and private researchers. These proposals should en-
courage public and private entities to enter patent pools. Patent
pools provide an effective, flexible mechanism to transfer rights by
limiting valuation, litigation, and enforcement costs.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps no technological advance in human history promises to
provide as much benefit to humanity as recent developments in
Damage Control: A Crackdown to Prevent Conflicts of Interest at the NIH, 291 Scientific American
18-20 (November 2004).
638. See35 U.S.C. § 200.
639. NEWBERG & DUNN, supra note 89, at 193 (citing NAT'L Sci. BD., NATIONAL PAT-
TERNS OF R&D RESOURCES: 2000 DATA UPDATE Table IA at http://www.nsf.gov/sbel/srs/
nsf01309/start.htm) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
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biotechnology. Some of the promises include biotechnological so-
lutions to countless diseases that plague us, such as cancer and
heart disease, and to world hunger. However, the very mechanism
that spurs development in the biotechnology industry should not
be weakened without adequate empirical evidence. A heightened
utility requirement, an expanded experimental use exception, or a
fair use exception for patent law will undermine the incentives that
patents provide to invent, disclose, and innovate.
At best the question of whether a Tragedy of the Anticommons
exists or will develop is unclear. However, studies indicate that
conditions conducive to the development of an anticommons exist.
Accordingly, additional study to determine the effect of govern-
ment policy on biotechnology innovation is warranted. Moreover,
the government should revise the Bayh-Dole Act to encourage bio-
technology sector participants to pool patent rights, thus ensuring
that government funded technology is accessible, and preserving
incentives to invent, disclose, and innovate.

